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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Supreme Court had original jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann.§ 78A-3-102(3)G). On January 29, 2014, the Utah Supreme Court entered an
order pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, transferring this
matter to the Utah Court of Appeals for decision. The Utah Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)G).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES & STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court err by entering a directed verdict against Lori Wimmer's

heirs on the issue of general damages, when evidence presented to the jury included the
following: that Lori lived with both her daughter Meghan and mother Alta when she went
@

to the hospital; that Meghan came to the hospital, laid her head on Lori's chest, and said
she loved her; that Alta visited Lori frequently in the hospital; and that Alta cried
hysterically when told Lori would be "a vegetable" and should not be resuscitated?
Standard ofReview: "Appellate courts review the grant or denial of a motion for
directed verdict for correctness." Proctor v. Costco Wholesale Corp. 2013 UT App 226, 1
6, 311 P .3d 564, 567.
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Issue preservei: R. at 4026-4032 (Plaintiffs Memorandum Opposing Directed
Verdict on General Damages Claim).
2. Did the trial court err in entering a directed verdict against Lori Wimmer' s
heirs on the issue of proximate cause when evidence presented to the jury stated that Dr.
Peterson told Alta Wimmer that Lori would likely be "a vegetable;" that on the contrary
Lori Wimmer was in fact "eminently salvageable" on the day she died; and that Dr.
Peterson's medical evaluation of Lori's "poor prognosis" was a cause of Alta's decision
to cease resuscitation of her daughter?

Standard ofReview: "Appellate courts review the grant or denial of a motion for
directed verdict for correctness." Proctor v. Costco Wholesale Corp. 2013 UT App 226, iJ
6, 311 P.3d 564, 567.

Issue preserved: R. at 3994-4001 (Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant Peterson's Motion for Directed Verdict) and R. at 4033-4040 (Memorandum
Opposing Directed Verdict for Defendant Peterson).

3. Did the trial court err by denying Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial under Utah

brief uses the following abbreviations: the consecutively paginated record on
appeal is referred to as ("R. at_"). The transcript of a hearing or trial testimony/ruling
is referred to by the consecutively paginated number on the cover of the transcript as
affixed by the court clerk on the bottom right corner, followed by the separate page
number within the transcript as provided by the transcriber (e.g., "R. _ at p. _").
Pursuant to Rule 24( e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, trial exhibits are cited
according to the exhibit number affixed by the trial court (e.g., "Plaintiffs Exhibit 11 ").
The Addendum is referred to by the page numbers affixed to the lower right corner of
1 This
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R. Civ. P. 59(a)(7) when the trial court had committed an error oflaw by granting a
~

directed verdict in favor of the defendants on the issue of general damages, per Issue 1,
above?
Standard ofReview: Generally, the trial court's ruling on a motion for new trial

will be disturbed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. Florez v. Schindler Elevator
Corp., 2010 UT App 254,, 10,240 P.3d 107, citing Donohue v. Intermountain Health
Care, 748 P.2d 1067, 1068 (Utah 1987).
However, in a case where the trial court relied on its interpretation of a question of
law as the basis for its ruling on a new trial motion, "[S]uch a legal decision is reviewed
under a correctness standard." Booth v. Booth, 2006 UT App 144,, 10, 134 P.3d 1151,
quoting, Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P. 2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993).
Issue preserved: R. at 4084-4095 (Memorandum Supporting Rule 59 Motion for

New Trial); R. at 4181-4184 (Reply); R. 4313 (oral argument on Motion for New Trial).
4. Did the trial court err in refusing to exclude evidence that Lori Wimmer left the
hospital on September 1, some 8 days before her death, when the medical issue on
September 1was high blood sugar, not a mismanaged re-intubation2, and when Dr.
Pandita's mismanagement of the re-intubation was the intervening cause of death?
Standard ofReview: Although intervening cause inquiries are typically

each page of the Addendum (e.g., "Add._").
2 Intubate (and re-intubate) means to place a breathing tube through the mouth or nose
into the trachea to allow the lungs to be mechanically ventilated. (R. 4308 at p. 6, 1. 8
though p. 7 I. 8.).
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fact-intensive, they can be decided as a matter of law. Breton v. Clyde Snow & Sessions,
2013 UT App 65, ,r 10,299 P.3d 13, citing Christensen & Jensen, PC v. Barrett & Daines,
2008 UT 64, ,r 32, 194 P.3d 931 (determining causation on summary judgment); Dee v.

Johnson, 2012 UT App 237, ,r,r 6-9, 286 P.3d 22 (holding that summary judgment was
proper where the only reasonable conclusion that could be drawn was that the defendant's
"negligent driving was [not] the cause which, in a natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any new cause, produced the injury, and without which the injury would not
have occurred"); Bansasine v. Bodell, 927 P.2d 675, 677 (Utah Ct.App.1996) (affirming
summary judgment where a reasonable jury could not have found that the defendant
caused the harm because he could not have foreseen the intervening cause of harm).
Issue preserved: R. at 3119-3137 (Motion in Limine for Exclusion of Against

Medical Advice Evidence); R. at 3549-3556 (Reply Memorandum).
5. Did the trial court err in excluding Dr. Charles Landers, M.D. as a rebuttal
witness, when Dr. Landers had been timely disclosed before trial; Defendants had
received his full report before trial; and his anticipated testimony would address issues
the other plaintiff experts were barred from addressing and was therefore not cumulative?
Standard ofReview: "[T]rial courts have wide discretion in determining the

admissibility of expert testimony." Depew v. Sullivan, 2003 UT App 152, ,r 42, 71 P.3d
601, 615.
Issue preserved: R. at 2096-2113 (Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition).
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CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS
1.

Wrongful Death
A.

The Utah Constitution

"The right of action to recover damages for injuries resulting in death, shall never
be abrogated, and the amount recoverable shall not be subject to any statutory
limitation, except in cases where compensation for injuries resulting in death is provided

for by law."
UTAH CONST. Art. XVI§ 5. (Emphasis added.)
B.

Utah's Wrongful Death Statute

"In every action under this section and Section 78B-3-105 damages may be given
as under all the circumstances of the case may be just."

Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-3-106(4). (Emphasis added.)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This appeal is taken from the trial court's Order on Defendants' Joint Motion for
Directed Verdict, entered on January 21, 2014 (R. at 4172-4178), as well as the court's
Order on Plaintifrs Motion for New Trial, entered on April 11, 2014 (R. at 4213-4218).
The court's Order Denying Plaintifrs Motion in Limine for Exclusion of"Against
Medical Advice" Evidence, entered on December 5, 2013 (R. at 3958-3960), and its
Memorandum Decision (granting defendants' motions to exclude Dr. Landers as a
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•
rebuttal expert), entered on July 5, 2011 (R. at 2180-2185), are also included in the
appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

This is a wrongful death action brought by Alta Wimmer ("Alta") for the death of
her 33-year-old daughter, Lori Wimmer ("Lori"). Lori had one daughter, Meghan, who
was 10 years old at the time of her mother's death.
Because the court's directed verdicts are at issue, the facts will be drawn from the
plaintifr s trial evidence and presented in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Background. Lori had been a diabetic for many years and wore an insulin pump.

On September 1, 2004, she went to Cottonwood Hospital Emergency Room to be
evaluated for hyperglycemia (high blood sugar). Dr. David Hasleton, M.D. treated her
there. (Defendant's Exhibit 1, at 000111.)3
She reported that she was having polyuria (excess urination) and polydipsia
(excess thirst) symptoms, both of which are common in diabetics. She denied any
headaches, neurological complaints, fever, cough, or upper respiratory symptoms. (Id.)
She had a history of hyperglycemic episodes and had presented to the Emergency
Department in the past for rehydration. On physical examination, Dr. Hasleton assessed
that she was awake, alert, and oriented. She was not in any acute distress. Her

3 The parties stipulated to admission of Defendant's Exhibit 1, a large black binder of
medical records. The Court admitted Defendant's Exhibit 1 into evidence early in
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•

neurologic examination was grossly intact without focal deficits. (Id.)
Dr. Hasleton's diagnosis was hyperglycemia from diabetic ketoacidosis4 (DKA)
or an infection. Lori was hydrated with 2 liters of saline and given 10 units of regular
insulin. Thereafter her blood glucose level went down to 497. She elected to go home,
saying she was comfortable taking care of herself there. She said she would increase her
insulin pump from 0.8 units to 1.0 units, which Dr. Hasleton "felt was okay." He did
recommend that she stay in the emergency department until her blood sugar level
normalized, but she refused despite knowing the risks that she may go into ketoacidosis
and/or coma. She stated she wanted to go home, that she understood the risks, and could
manage on her own. (Id.)
During his trial testimony, Dr. Hasleton conceded that while he explained the
normal risks to Lori, he did not warn her of any risks or complications that included
@>

injury or death at the hands of a health provider, because that was not a complication he
tells anybody. (R. 4309, at 114.)
Dr. Hasleton concluded Lori had mild acidosis. He did not admit her to the
hospital. He gave her 20 more units of regular insulin and told her to check her blood
sugar again upon arriving home, in the middle of the night, and the next morning. He
wrote that she would be discharged against medical advice. Lori did not sign any forms

~

Plaintifrs case. (R. 4309 at p. 60, 11. 3-21.)
4 Diabetic ketoacidosis is a metabolic abnormality in diabetic patients. It occurs when the
body produces high levels of blood acids called ketones. Diabetic ketoacidosis develops
when high blood sugar leads to excessive ketones and excessive acid in the blood.
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acknowledging that she had been discharged against medical advice nor that she had been
informed she was leaving against medical advice. (Defendant's Exhibit 1, at 000111.)
She went home.
The Death of Lori Wimmer. The next day, September 2, Lori returned to the
hospital with significant vomiting and was found to be in severe DKA. She was
significantly agitated and in respiratory distress in the emergency room, was intubated
emergently, and was placed on a ventilator machine in the ICU. (Defendant's Exhibit 1,
at 000337, Death Summary dictated by Dr. Pandita.) Lori remained in the ICU for the
next 6 days.
Lori's DKA improved with aggressive hydration and insulin therapy. She was
sometimes agitated, so she was continuously sedated. Her heart was checked with an
echocardiogram that showed normal function. (Id.)
On September 5, Dr. Peterson was called for a neurological consultation and felt
Lori had metabolic encephalopathy 6 due to DKA. An EEG 7 was obtained which showed
a slow response. Dr. Peterson felt Lori had a poor prognosis based on the overall clinical
status as well as the EEG findings. (Id.)
On September 7, Dr. Pandita saw Lori again. By then, her DKA had completely
resolved, but she continued to be comatose. Lori was still on sedation at this time, and it

6 Metabolic encephalopathy describes brain tissue not functioning properly. The
impairment is not due to stroke or other physical injury, but due instead to metabolic
abnormalities, such as toxins, infection or lack of oxygen. (R. 4309 at pp. 161-164).
7 EEG is an electroencephalogram, a way of measuring voltages related to brain activity.
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was unclear whether some of her neurological deficits were due to sedation. However,
@J

she did not need significant support from the ventilator, so he started weaning her from
the machine. Nevertheless, her neurological function was still poor, and it was unclear
whether this was due to sedation. Dr. Pandita told Lori's family that he would try to

Ii

discontinue sedation and then assess Lori's underlying neurologic response. (Id.)
On September 8, Dr. Pandita wrote that Lori's blood gases looked good, and she
had a good gag reflex. He noted that it was difficult to keep her off sedation and keep her
intubated as well. Dr. Pandita felt it important not to restart sedation so he could learn her
underlying neurologi_c response. Since she had been on minimal ventilator support, he
thought it reasonable to extubate8 her and see if all her agitation was due to being
intubated and whether she would not need more sedation. He extubated Lori that morning.
(Id.)

The difficulty noted by Dr. Pandita in keeping Lori intubated was observed by
Lori's sister Teresa and mother Alta. On September 3, Teresa and Alta were in Lori's
room and observed that Lori would kick her arms and legs and grab for the breathing tube.
The hospital staff restrained her around each wrist and each ankle to prevent her
grabbing the tube. (R. 4311 at 572-573.) On September 7, Teresa was told that Lori was
doing much better. She was excited to see her, and when she came to her room, she saw
that Lori was totally exposed from the waist down. The nurse said they took the sheet
away because she kept kicking it off. (R. 4311 at p. 594, 11. 6-20.)
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After her extubation, Lori was treated for stridor9 at 11 :45 and 11 :55 that morning
by a respiratory therapist, Max Kunzler. (R. 4309 at p. 116-118.) Mr. Kunzler testified
that Lori was a good candidate for MDI (a metered-dose inhaler, a device for
self-administered lung medication) because she could hold her breath for 3 seconds and
could follow directions. (R. 4309 at 150-151.)
While Lori was with Mr. Kunzler, Lori's mother Alta and sister Teresa arrived for
a family conference with Dr. Pandita, Dr. Peterson, and a social worker named Brenda
Zigich. At this conference, Dr. Peterson told Alta that there was a progressive
deterioration in Lori's neurological status, that she had no purposeful response, that her
neurological prognosis was very poor, and that Lori could end up in a "persistent
vegetative state." Alta told the doctors that Lori had clearly said she did not want to end
up in a vegetative state. However, the family was not ready to withdraw care and needed
more time to decide. (Defendant's Exhibit 1, at p. 000338.)
Around this same time, Lori began having increased respiratory distress. The
doctors decided to re-intubate Lori while the family decided what to do. Lori's vocal
cords were very hard to visualize, and there was significant swelling around her larynx.
Bag mask ventilation 10 was started. Dr. Pandita called for assistance with the

8 Extubate

means to remove the breathing tube.
9 Stridor is a high-pitched sound in the vocal cord area, indicating swelling in the vocal
cords and difficulty breathing. (R. 4309, at p. 121, 11. 13-25.)
10 Bag mask ventilation, known as "bagging," provides oxygen to a patient with the help
of a mask on the face, connected to a bag. The bag is compressed, forcing oxygen to the
lungs. (R. 4310, at p. 332, 11. 16-24.)
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re-intubation. Dr. Eric Smart, an emergency room doctor, arrived and attempted to
ti,

re-intubate without success. Dr. Pandita called for an in-house anesthesiologist who again
attempted to re-intubate, without success. They again started bagging 11 and were able to
keep Lori's oxygen at acceptable levels by that means. Dr. Smart then suggested a blind

<I

intubation, which he did himself. In a blind intubation, the doctor puts the tube into the
patient's mouth without being able to see whether it goes into the trachea (leading to the
lungs) or the esophagus (leading to the stomach). Meanwhile a tracheotomy kit (to cut a
hole in Lori's throat in case the tube did not go into the trachea) had been requested and
brought in. (Id.)
The anesthesiologist felt that Lori's chest movement seemed symmetrical and the
tube placement was likely okay. However, Lori's blood oxygen levels did not come up,
and her heart started slowing down. (Id.)
Dr. Smart, the Emergency Physician, saw that Lori's blood oxygen levels were not
improving and recognized the tube was not in the trachea. He charted that "I
recommended that it be removed. There was some concern that if it were in place, we
would hate to lose the tube placement expressed by several other people in the room.
However, it was my opinion that the tube was not in place." (Defendant's Exhibit 1, at
000130.)
Dr. Ali, plaintifrs expert, put it a little more plainly: "Well, my understanding is

Bagging can successfully deliver oxygen to a patient for 15, 30 minutes, even longer.
(R. 4310, at p. 338, 11. 17-25.)
11

(ii)
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that Dr. Smart, who put the tube in, was adamant that the tube needed to come out, but
unfortunately, he was overruled by the captain of the ship [Dr. Pandita]." (R. 4310 at p.
517, ·IL 20-23.) "What we have here is Dr. Smart' s note, which documents an extended
course of low oxygen level and a doctor that is basically fussing around with the
bronchoscope 12, looking at this and basically wasting time while the patient is dying." (R.
4310 at p. 549 I. 25 top. 550, I. 4.)
Dr. Ali found that Dr. Smart's note described a "disaster" in Dr. Pandita's
handling of the situation, observing that Dr. Smart wrote such a long note because "[h]e
wanted to make sure that he didn't get blamed for what he thought was a disaster." (R.
4310 at p. 551, 11. 2-4.) It was during this period of time, while Dr. Pandita was fussing
around with the brorichoscope, that Lori went into cardiac arrest and received CPR.
(Defendant's Exhibit 1, at 000130.)
Dr. Ali testified that Dr. Pandita's failure to remove the tube immediately upon
learning it was misplaced was a breach of the standard of care, that the breach caused
Lori's death, and that Dr. Pandita's refusal to remove the tube immediately was so
unreasonable that, if Dr. Pandita were his student, he would "flunk him." (R. 4310 at p.
518, 11. 1-15.) It was Dr. Ali's opinion that in Lori's situation, her life was on the line and
every second counted; Dr. Pandita should have immediately removed the misplaced tube
and resumed a method of ventilation that was effective-namely, the bag mask. (R. 4310
atp. 516, 11. 15-22 andp. 517, 11. 2-4.)

12 A

bronchoscope is a long, flexible tube with a light at one end, used to view the lungs.
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•

While the failed attempts at re-intubation and using the bronchoscope were
•

underway, Brenda Zigich escorted Alta and Lori's family into the room where
resuscitation was taking place. Dr. Pandita asked Alta ifhe should continue resuscitation.
Alta, believing that her daughter had no hope of meaningful recovery, asked that
resuscitation be stopped. Dr. Pandita then stopped CPR. Lori expired and was declared
dead at 1338 hours. (Id.)

•

Alta Wimmer's Suit for Medical Malpractice. On June 14, 2005, Alta Wimmer
filed suit for the wrongful death of her daughter. She brought suit on her own behalf and
also on behalf of Meghan, who is another heir of Lori's estate. (R. at 1-9.)
At trial, Alta Wimmer presented evidence of the following (for citations to the trial
record, please see "The Death of Lori Wimmer" section, supra) that Dr. Pandita was
negligent in managing the removal of Lori's breathing tube ("extubation") and the
attempts to re-intubate Lori, and in failing to timely maintain the flow of oxygen to Lori's
brain, either by bagging or by cutting a hole in Lori's throat to open an airway. Dr.
Pandita failed to recognize that when Dr. Smart blindly re-intubated Lori, the breathing

•

tube went into Lori's esophagus rather than her trachea, so air was going to Lori's
stomach rather than her lungs. Upon hearing Dr. Smart's report that the tube was
misplaced in the esophagus, the standard of care required immediate removal of the tube
and a return to manual ventilation with a bag and mask. Instead, Dr. Pandita's "fussing
around" delayed removal of the tube and delayed bagging for such a long time that Lori's
heart slowed dangerously, prompting CPR and eventual death.
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The plaintiff also presented evidence that Dr. Peterson was negligent in
prematurely advising Alta that Lori could end up in a persistent vegetative state, and that
his negligence was a cause of Lori's death. Plaintifrs expert Dr. Ginsberg testified that
in two studies he was aware of, diabetics of similar age and health to Lori, who were in
comas from diabetic ketoacidosis, had a mortality rate of 13 percent in one study and zero
(0) percent in another study. (R. 4310 at p. 453, 1. 12 top. 454, 1. 20.) He also testified
that Lori was "eminently salvageable," that she just needed more time to get back to
normal (R. 4310 at p. 456, 11. 1-2), and that much of Lori's reduced neurological function

•

was due to the large amounts of sedatives in her system rather than any real neurological
damage. (R. 4310 at p. 458, 1. 11 top. 460, 1. 12.)
Dr. Peterson's grim prognosis about the condition of Lori's brain, delivered in his
capacity as a neurologist, caused Alta to believe that Lori would not have a meaningful
recovery even if resuscitation were successful. Thus she declined to continue
resuscitation when confronted with the alarming scene of her dying daughter undergoing
CPR and attempted intubation. (R. 4310 at p. 468, 11. 8-23.)
The Pretrial Evidentiary Rulings. On July 5, 2011, the trial court entered a
Memorandum Decision granting defendants' motion to exclude Dr. Charles Landers as a
rebuttal expert for the plaintiff. (R. at 2180.) The court reached the conclusion that "Dr.
Landers' testimony is not proper rebuttal testimony and is cumulative of plaintifr s other
experts." (R. at 2183.)
On December 5, 2013, the trial court entered an Order Denying Plaintifrs Motion
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•

in Limine for Exclusion of "Against Medical Advice" Evidence. The court ruled that
ii)

medical records referring to Lori's departure "against medical advice" may be admitted.
As reason for its ruling, the court adopted the reasons stated in defendants' opposition
memorandum. (R. at 3958-3960.)
The Directed Verdicts. After 4 days of trial and the testimony of 10 witnesses,
plaintiff rested her case. Defendants then moved for directed verdict on the grounds that
plaintiff had not proved noneconomic damages and, in the case of Dr. Peterson, had not
proved causation. The court orally ruled on the motions on the morning of December 12,
2014 (R. 4312 at pp. 704-709), and on January 21, 2014, the Court entered its formal
Order on Defendants' Joint Motion for Directed Verdict. (R. at 4172.)
As to the question of noneconomic damages, the court found that plaintifrs trial
evidence "says nothing about the loss of society, love, companionship, protection and

@

affection allegedly suffered ... and is therefore insufficient to establish a claim for
non-economic damages under Oxendine v. Overturf" (R. at 417 5.)
As to the question of causation, the court found that "[d]uring trial, Plaintiff
elicited testimony from her expert Dr. "Ginsberg that Dr. Peterson's actions indirectly led
to Alta Wimmer' s decision to cease resuscitation efforts on the decedent. The Court

•

finds that such an indirect effect is insufficient for Plaintiff to meet her burden pursuant
to Proctor v. Costco Wholesale Corp . ... " (R. at 4176.)
The Motion for New Trial. After the trial court had orally ruled on the directed
verdict motions and had released the jury from service, plaintiffs filed a Motion for New
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Trial on or about December 31, 2013. (R. at 4082.) Plaintiffs argued that a new trial
should be granted on the basis of an error of law under Rule 59(a)(7), namely the
granting of the directed verdicts.
Oral argument was held on March 18, 2014. (R. 4313,passim.) During oral
argument, the trial court made several notable statements that indicated it was indulging
negative inferences against the plaintiffs, rather than in their favor, and in fact said "the
heck with you" and did not care how good plaintiffs arguments were. Examples of
statements from the trial judge, regarding Lori Wimmer, include the following:
1.

"Thanks for dying. It hurts. I'm sad. But it's the best result for everybody."

(R. 4313, at p. 35, 11. 21-22.)
2.

~'There's no positive inference at all. I mean there's nothing positive in this

relationship." (R. 4313, at p.35, 1. 24-25.)
3.

"[M]om and dad walk out with crocodile tears and all this money." (R.

4313, at p. 38, 11. 4-5."
4.

"But this is an in-your-face argument, and it's not being taken very well by

this Court. I'm indulging it. I'll take it. But I'm telling you, you're out of order and
you're offensive and you don't need to be .... But the way you're presenting it, it's
like-the Court's either going to just be shamed into adopting your-or it will dig in its
heels and say to heck with you. I don't care how good your argument is." (R. 4313, at p.
25 1. 22 top. 26, 1. 8.)
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5.

e

"[T]hat child has been nothing but a source of frustration, expense, anger

and heartbreak to that parent. ... now this child who has been strung out on dope and
drugs and crime for 25 years is now in the hospital, the victim of some wrongful act."
(R. 4313, at p. 28, 11. 7-9, 18-20.
After expressing its views, the trial court entered its final Order on Plaintifr s
Motion for New Trial on April 11, 2014, denying a new trial. (R. at 4213-4218).
This appeal timely followed (R. at 4050-51; R. at 4219-4300).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I. Directed Verdict on General Damages.
The court's directed verdict on general damages was error because plaintiffs
(I

presented competent evidence of their damages at trial. Plaintiffs have a constitutional
right to recover damages for wrongful death, not subject to any statutory limitation. Any
evidence, no matter how improbable, is sufficient to overcome directed verdict.

II. Directed Verdict on Proximate Cause.
The court's directed verdict on proximate case was error because plaintiffs
presented competent evidence of proximate causation. Proximate cause is generally a
fact-intensive question for the jury.

III. Denial of a New Trial.
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A new trial should have been granted because. the court committed an error of law
in granting the directed verdict on general damages. If the appellate court agrees with
that proposition, the new trial ruling should be reversed.
IV. Refusal to Exclude Evidence ofLeaving Hospital 8 Days Before Death.

The trial court erred in admitting evidence that Lori left the hospital on September
1 against medical advice. The intervening acts of Dr. Pandita and Dr. Peterson broke the
chain of proximate cause for Lori's acts. Utah follows the majority rule that a patient's
pre-treatment negligence does not excuse the doctor's negligent treatment. Lori cannot
be held contributorily negligent because her negligence is not causally connected to her
lllJUry.

V. Striking Dr. Landers as a Rebuttal Witness.

The court erred in striking Dr. Landers as a rebuttal witness. Plaintiffs have a
right to rebuttal when the defense raises new issues in its case. Dr. Landers' testimony
was not cumulative.

Page 26 of 63

ARGUMENT

I.

The Court's Directed Verdict on General Damages 13 Was Error;
There Was Competent Evidence of General Damages.
A.

Plaintiffs Have a Constitutional Right to Recover Damages for
Wrongful Death, Not Subject to Any Statutory Limitation, and
A Statutory Right to Damages Based on "All the Circumstances."

The right to recover damages for wrongful death is assured by the Utah
Constitution. "The right of action to recover damages for injuries resulting in death,
shall never be abrogated, and the amount recoverable shall not be subject to any
statutory limitation, except in cases where compensation for injuries resulting in death

is provided for by law." Utah Const. Art. XVI,§ 5 (emphasis added).
In the present case, the defendants persuaded the trial court that plaintifr s
damages should be limited to certain explicit factors previously enumerated as guides for
determining general damages, but the Utah Constitution bars any such limitation on the
amount recoverable in a wrongful death case.
Because the Utah Constitution expressly forbids any limitation on damages, and

The Model Utah Jury Instructions, 2d Ed. (MUJI 2d) use "noneconomic damages" as a
synonym for general damages, but many Utah cases use the term "general damages."
Hence, the term "general damages" will be used herein to refer to the same principle.
Moreover, the term "noneconomic damages" is phrased in a negative way (using
the prefix "non-") such that it carries a negative connotation, suggesting to the mind that
noneconomic damages are somehow lesser, or non-important, or non-existent, compared
to economic damages, when in fact Utah case law makes it clear that general damages are
frequently more important, and more valuable, than economic damages. See, e.g.,
Oxendine v. Overturf, 1999 UT 4, 1 19, 973 P .2d 417, citing Jones v. Carvell, 641 P .2d
105, 108 (Utah 1982) ("the greatest losses arising from the wrongful death of a child are
not those losses which are economic in nature.") This importance is better reflected by
13

@

@)
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because Utah's Wrongful Death statute expressly mandates that damages be awarded
according to "all the circumstances" of the case (Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-3-106(4)), the
trial court's reliance on any subset of factors listed in Oxendine v. Overturf, Switzer v.

Reynolds, or any other case, in directing a verdict that prevented plaintiff from recovering
damages for Lori's wrongful death was erroneous and contrary to both the Utah
Constitution and Utah statute.

B.

The Evidence Prese~ted to the Jury During Trial
Was Sufficient to Overcome Directed Verdict.

The bulk of the evidence regarding the society, companionship, love, affection,
and kindly demeanor between Lori and her heirs (Alta and Meghan) came from two trial
witnesses: Teresa Moore (Lori's sister), and Alta Wimmer herself. The following
evidence of general damages was presented at trial.
I.

The Testimony of Teresa Moore (Lori's sister):

Teresa Moore, Lori's sister, testified at trial to numerous facts about Lori's
relationship with her heirs (Meghan and Alta) that had a bearing on general damages:
(a) Meghan [Lori's daughter and heir] was in the hospital room where her mother
had just barely died (right after the machines had been turned off), and "Meghan walked
over to her [Lori] and put her head on her chest and just told her that she loved her and
that she wished she would wake up. And then we just - let Meghan just stay with her for
a little while and then we left the room." (R. 4311 at p. 631, 11. 1-6) (emphasis added).

the term "general damages."
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(b) That Meghan was Lori's only child, and that Lori and Meghan lived together
with Alta Wimmer [Lori's mother and heir]. (R. 4311 at p. 564, 11. 20-25 top. 565, 1. 5.)

(c) That Alta Wimmer spent a great deal of time at the hospital with Lori. (R.
4311, at p. 568, 11. 5-6; R. 4311 at p. 600, 11. 11-16.)
(d) That when Alta Wimmer was told that her daughter, Lori, would be a
"vegetable," the comment put Alta into a "state of shock." (R. 4311 at p. 617, 11. 8-23.)
(Emphasis added.)
(e) That when Alta Wimmer was led into the room where the doctors were
performing CPR and trying to resuscitate Lori, Alta began crying hysterically. (R. 4311
at p. 626, 11. 20-23.) (Emphasis added.)

(t) That when Alta Wimmer was told that Lori's condition was not looking good,
and that Lori would likely be a "vegetable" or severely retarded, Alta began shaking and
€Ji0

crying. (R. 4311 atp. 618, 11. 5-9; R. 4311 atp. 619, 11. 12-25.)
(g) That when Alta was discussing Lori's medical care, specifically Dr. Pandita's
decision to extubate Lori, Alta's desire was to see that "the best thing" was done for Lori.
(R. 4311 at p. 608, 11. 20-23.)
2.

The Testimony of Alta Wimmer (Lori's mother):

(a)

Alta was having a "rough time" emotionally with the fact that her daughter

Lori was sick and in the ICU. (R. 4311 at p. 644, 11. 13-18.)
(b)

Alta went into a "state of shock" when she heard that Lori's condition had

taken a tum for the worse. (R. 4311 at p. 647, 11. 2-4.)
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(c)

Alta's love, affection, and concern for Lori were fundamental to the

end-of-life family conference during which the social worker, Brenda Zigich, kept
repeatedly patting Alta on the leg and saying "you wouldn't want her [Lori] to live like
this." (R. 4311 at p. 648, 11. 12-21.)
The fact that Alta knew what Lori's wishes were for end-of-life planning ("The
mother informed us that the patient had clearly indicated she did not want to end up in a
vegetative state.") is also evidence of the society and companionship and trust between
Lori and Alta. (Defendant's Exhibit 1 at 000338.)
This testimony, presented to the jury at trial, by members of Lori's own family,
provides sufficient evidence of the companionship, society, love and affection that
existed between Lori, Meghan, and Alta, and provides a sound basis on which a
reasonable jury could find general damages for Lori's heirs.

C.

Wrongful Death Actions Occupy a "Privileged Position"; General
Damages May Be Inferred from "All Circumstances" of a Case.

Damages awarded for wrongful death are in a special class, and are not limited to
specific elements, but are guided by all the circumstances of the case. "In every action
under this section and Section 78B-3-105 damages may be given as under all the
circumstances of the case may be just." Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-3-106(4).
Recently, the Utah Supreme Court has reiterated that "wrongful death occupies a
position of privilege among torts." Bybee v. Abdulla, 2008 UT 35, ~ 18, 189 P.3d 40.
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Thus, the trial court's ruling that there was no evidence as to the so-called
"mandatory elements" of general damages is improper under Utah law. Utah law requires
no particularity as to any element of general damages. Rather, general damage is in itself
an element of the larger claim for wrongful death.
Elements of damage discussed in Utah case law are permissive elements which the
jury "may" consider as guidelines. For example, "[T]he loss of affection, counsel and
advice, the loss of deceased care and solicitude for the welfare of... her family and the
loss of the comfort and pleasure the family of the deceased would have received are all
matters to be considered in assessing damages recoverable ... " In re Behm 's Estate, at 661
(1950).

Jones v Carvell, 641 P.2d 105 (Utah 1982) stated that "to assign a monetary
value to loss of comfort, society, love companionship, advice and protection in some
i)

realistic manner, the trier of fact may consider factors relating to the physical, emotional,
and psychological relationship between the deceased and those entitled to recover,
including the kindly demeanor [among the] family." Id., at 108.

Jones went on to opine that "such losses are difficult to quantify and impossible to
fit into a mathematical formula which translates them in any precise fashion into
monetary values. But the alternatives raise an even more serious problem. To say that
the law recognizes no loss for intangible injuries resulting from a wrongful death is
repugnant ... " Id., at 108. (Emphasis added.) "Experience demonstrates thatjuries and
judges are able to translate the loss of a child's life into monetary values in a manner
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which has been generally accepted as reasonable and has avoided grossly disparate
damage awards." Id.
The discretion of the jury in awarding damages will of course be guided by
the evidence adduced, the common sense of the jury, and the values they
reflect from the community from whence they come. Various kinds of
evidence are likely to have some relevancy in giving appropriate guidance.
This Court has previously referred to the kindly demeanor between the
members of the family as a relevant factor. Id., at 110.
Such factors do not constitute a separate measure of damage as such, but
they may demonstrate the nature of the psychological investment which has
contributed to the love and affection which tend to create a bonding of the
child and its parents. To that extent such factors may assist in the
determination of the monetary amount to be awarded for the loss of love,
affection and society.

Id., at lll.
Given that these damages are difficult to calculate mathematically, wrongful death
plaintiffs are given considerable latitude "to demonstrate the nature of the psychological
investment which has contributed to the love and affection which tend to create a bonding
of the child and its (sic) parents. To that extent such factors may assist in the
determination of the monetary amount to be awarded for the loss of love, affection and
society." Id., at ll 1.
The Model Utah Jury Instructions provide that "the law does not require the
testimony of any witness to establish the amount of noneconomic damages." MUJI 2d
CV 2004 (2014) (emphasis added). This same instruction, which the parties stipulated to
use in this case (R. at 3843, 3881, 2) also provides that such a determination of general
damages is the province of the jury and that if a jury finds for the plaintiff, but fails to
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award any general damages, the jury is instructed to make such a damages award, "even
el)

though they may be difficult to compute." MUJI 2d CV 2004 (2014).
In the present case, a woman died in the prime of her life (33 years old). When she
died, she was the mother of a ten-year-old daughter. She was a daughter herself. Both of

GD

Lori's heirs, her mother Alta and daughter Meghan, had an uncontroverted bond of
society, companionship and love with Lori. To conclude that the jury was not even
entitled to consider the fact that such a catastrophe resulted in general damages to the
woman's heirs is contrary to law and common experience.
Moreover, the central core ofa wrongful death action is the loss ofthe
companionship and society ofthe deceased. Once evidence was presented at trial that
Lori lived with Alta and Meghan, as indeed it was, her "companionship and society" was
sufficiently established to create a jury issue. Lori's death severed that companionship

@>

and society, thus triggering the damages allowed under the Wrongful Death statute. As
noted above, "In every action under this section ... damages may be given as under all
the circumstances of the case may be just." Utah Code §78B-3-106 (4).
Under the wrongful death statute, there is but a single cause of action, viz.,
it arises from a particular wrongful act for which there can be but one claim
against the tort-feasor for damages .... In this single action the full value of
the life of deceased is determined and recovered, and the wrongdoer cannot
be compelled to respond again for the damages ... This action is for the loss
suffered by the heirs by reason of death. This Court enumerated the
elements to be considered in assessing damages recoverable in a wrongful
death action: financial support furnished; loss of affection, counsel, and
advice; loss of deceased's care and solicitude for the welfare of the family;
and loss of the comfort and pleasure the family of deceased would have
received."
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Switzer v. Reynolds, 606 P.2d 244,246 (Utah 1980).
In addition, as Lori's personal representative, plaintiff Alta Wimmer is also
entitled to recover the special and general damages sustained by her deceased daughter
Lori, which include the loss of the value of Lori's life under Utah Code Ann.§
78B-3-107.
A cause of action arising out of personal injury to a person, or death caused
by the wrongful act or negligence of another, does not abate upon the death
of the ... injured person. The injured person or the personal representatives
or heirs of the person who died, has a cause of action against the wrongdoer
... for special and general damages ...

Id., at (l)(a).
Utah has not limited recovery under either its wrongful death or survival statutes
to economic losses. "[T]his jurisdiction has emphasized from the beginning that the
greatest losses arising from the wrongful death of a child are not those losses which are
economic in nature. It is the loss of society, love, companionship, protection and
affection which usually constitute the heart of the action." Jones, at 108.
Thus the issue of general damages should not have been taken from the jury by a
directed verdict.

D.

"Any Evidence" "No Matter How Improbable" Is Sufficient to
Overcome a Directed Verdict.
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A directed verdict "motion can be granted only when the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter oflaw." Moore v. Smith 2007 UT App. 101,, 18, 158 P.3d 562.
See also, Beardv. K-Mart Corp., 2000 UT App. 285,, 5, 12 P.3d 1015.

"Where there is any evidence that raises a question of material fact, no matter how
~

improbable the evidence may appear, judgment as a matter of law is improper." Ottens v.
McNeil, 2010 UT App. 237,, 19,239 P.3d 308, quoting Young v. Fire Ins. Exch., 2008

UT App. 114,, 20, 182 P.3d 911. Accordingly, the Utah appellate courts will "review a
trial court's grant of directed verdict for correctness [and will sustain a directed verdict
only ifJ after examining all evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party,
there is no competent evidence that would support a verdict in the non-moving party's
favor." Ferguson v. Williams & Hunt, Inc., 2009 UT 49,, 19,221 P.3d 205.
When a trial court rules on a motion for directed verdict, that court must review
(i)

"the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may fairly be drawn therefrom in the
light most favorable to the [non-moving party and determine ifJ 'reasonable minds could
disagree with the ground asserted for directing a verdict."' Renegade Oil, Inc. v.
Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 2004 UT App. 356,, 6, 101 P.3d 383. See Mahmoodv. Ross,

1999 UT 104, 116, 990 P.2d 933. Similarly, whether a party has proven a prima facie
case, such as the element of general damages, is a question of law. Handy v. U.S. Bank,
2008 UT App 9,, 12, 177 P.3d 80.

E.

The General Damages Issue Should Have Gone to the Jury Even
Without "Direct Evidence" of Pain and Suffering.
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The Utah Supreme Court has held that it is reversible error to fail to instruct a jury
on mental pain and anguish, "even where there is no direct evidence of such mental
pain ... as [it may be] fairly inferred from injuries sustained." Juddv. Rowley's Cherry

Hill Orchards, Inc., 611 P.2d 1216, 1221 (Utah 1980).
Lori Wimm~r' s case involved the ultimate injury-death. If ever there were a case
where mental pain and anguish could be "inferred from injuries sustained," death would
be such a case. No direct evidence of mental pain and anguish is required when the
"injuries sustained" support a fair inference of pain and suffering. Death, and the effect of
death on one's family, can be fairly said to be such an injury.
To assign a monetary value to loss of comfort, society, love, companionship,
advice, and protection in some realistic manner, the trier of fact may consider factors
relating to the physical, emotional, and psychological relationship, between the deceased
and those entitled to recover, including the kindly demeanor between members of a

family." Jones, at 108 (emphasis added).
Juries are generally allowed wide discretion in the assessment of damages. Cruz v.

Montoya, 660 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1983). Where personal injuries involve a loss of
employment, personal inconvenience, and pain and suffering, there is no set formula to
compute the amount of damages. Jorgensen v. Gonzales, 14 Utah 2d 330,383 P.2d 934
(1963).
The trial court, in granting the directed verdict, misread the holdings of

Stevens-Henager College v. Eagle Gate College, et al., 2011 UT App 37,248 P. 3d 1025;
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Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 709 P.2d 330 (Utah 1985); and
Sohm v. Dixie Eye Center, 2007 UT App 235, 166 P.3d 614. These cases require only

that there be some evidence of a "reasonable probability" of the fact that damages
occurred, not the incantation of any magical words to establish general damages. The
€i)

legal standard for such evidence must be viewed, along with "all reasonable inferences,"
in a "light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Renegade Oil, 2004 UT App 356, 16;
Mahmood, 1999 UT 104, ~ 16.

The fact that Lori Wimmer lived at home with her mother Alta and daughter
Meghan was evidence of a "reasonable probability" that damages were suffered by Alta
and Meghan, her heirs. The court trial weighed this evidence on its own, substituting its
own view for that of the jury, stating that people who live together may not necessarily
like one another (even gratuitously invoking the poet Robert Frost that "Home is the
Ci)

place ... they have to take you in"). (R. 4312 at 707, 11. 24-25.)
Had the jury been allowed to consider the question, they would have been free to
draw precisely the opposite inference that a grown daughter and mother (Lori and Alta)
had a wonderful bond. Moreover, Meghan's loss of her mother, especially in a family
where the parents were living separately, would wreak irreparable and life-long damage
on a 10-year-old daughter, especially one who put her head on her dying mother's chest,
told her she loved her, and asked her to awake. Mother and child were not estranged.

There was no evidence that they even disliked one another. Simply put, a child of
Meghan's age would be bereft at the loss of her mother. A mother, especially one who is
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living with her daughter and daily at her daughter's bedside, would be bereft at the death
of her 33-year-old child. The court had no basis in allowing poets, even a Poet Laureate
like Robert Frost, to decide an issue bound for the jury, and it committed an error in law
by so doing.

F.

Oxendine v. Overturf Does Not Apply In This Case.

The trial court found "particularly persuasive" the case of Oxendine v. Overturf,
1999 UT 4, 973 P .2 417 for the key part of its analysis that no "general damages" had
been proven.
However, the Oxendine case did not apply to the facts that were before the trial
court. Contrary to the trial court's stated assumption, Oxendine was not actually a
medical malpractice or wrongful death case. Rather, as noted in the first paragraph of the
opinion, it was an appeal from separate cases "concerning the proper distribution between
heirs of settlement proceeds." Oxendine, at ,I 1. The issue before the court was a
"summary judgment in favor of ... the probate heirs and their attorneys. The trial court
held, as a matter of law, that she was not entitled to bring claims against them to recover
a share in the settlement proceeds." Id. ( emphasis added).
Thus, the key issue was whether or not the plaintiff could claim a share of the
settlement proceeds. The issue was not whether a claim for medical malpractice or
wrongful death had been made out against a doctor. The wrongful death claim was never
at issue because a settlement was paid, and the dispute concerned only how to divide
those settlement proceeds.
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Moreover, it is unprecedented under Utah law to hold that in a wrongful death
case against a negligent tortfeasor, an individual heir must prove the extent of her general
damages to overcome a motion for directed verdict. Neither defendants nor the trial court
have cited a single case in support of such a novel proposition. None has been found to

il

the best of counsel's knowledge.
II.

The Court's Directed Verdict on Proximate Cause Was Error;
There Was Competent Evidence of Proximate Cause.
The trial court erred in granting a directed verdict in favor of Dr. David Peterson

on the grounds that there was no testimony establishing that his negligence was a
proximate cause of Lori Wimmer's death.

A.

Proximate Cause Is Generally a Fact-Intensive Question for the Jury.

"Generally, causation 'cannot be resolved as a matter of law."' Butterfield v.

Okubo, 83 l P .2d 97, 106 (Utah 1992). "Proximate cause is an issue of fact. Thus, only if
there is no evidence upon which a reasonable jury could infer causation, is summary
judgment appropriate." Harline v. Barker, 854 P.2d 595, 600 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), cert.

denied, 862 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993).
Causation is highly fact-sensitive. "[C]ausation is a highly fact-sensitive element
of any cause of action and generally cannot be resolved as a matter oflaw." Breton v.
€i>

Clyde Snow & Sessions, 2013 UT App 65,, 10,299 P.3d 13. Utah courts have
recognized that "[ f]act-sensitive cases ... do not lend themselves to a determination on
summary judgment." Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1292 (Utah Ct.
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App., 1996). Likewise, they should not be determined on directed verdict.
"[D]oubts about whether a nonmovant has established a genuine issue of material
fact should be resolved in favor of permitting the party to go to trial." Butterfield, at 107.
In Butterfield, under facts similar to those in the present case, "plaintiff adduced expert
evidence creating genuine issues of material fact as to whether the doctors' conduct was
negligent and whether it caused [plaintifr s] death. Consequently, the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment for [the doctors]." Id.
Directed verdict, like summary judgment, resolves the proximate cause issue as a
matter oflaw without a jury. For the same reason, directed verdict should be rejected.
Proximate cause is "that cause which, in a natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any new cause, produced the injury, and without which the injury would not
have occurred." Bunker v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 38 Utah 575, 114 P. 764, 775 (1911).
"An event is the legal or proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury when the event
'in natural and continuous sequence, (unbroken by an efficient intervening cause),
produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred.'" Magana v.

Dave Roth Constr., 2009 UT 45,127, 215 P.3d 143 (quoting Mitchell v. Pearson Enters.,
697 P.2d 240, 245-46 (Utah 1985)).
The current Model Utah Jury Instruction defining "cause" reads as follows: "As
used in the law, the word "cause" has a special meaning, and you must use this meaning
whenever you apply the word. "Cause" means that: (1) The person's act or failure to act
produced the harm directly or set in motion events that produced the harm in a
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natural and continuous sequence; and (2) The person's act or failure to act could be

<e

foreseen by a reasonable person to produce a harm of the same general nature. There

may be more than one cause of the same harm." MUJI 2d CV309 (2014) (emphasis
added). This jury instruction was stipulated to by the parties. (R. at 3843, 3877 .)
The trial court erroneously focused only on the first method of causation (i.e., a
"direct cause") and overlooked the second, alternate, and equally valid method of
causation: the "natural and continuous sequence" mode of causation.

B.

Plaintiffs Presented Sufficient Evidence that Dr. Peterson's
Negligent Medical Advice Was a Proximate Cause of Lori's Death.

There was sufficient evidence adduced at trial that Dr. Peterson's negligent advice
caused the death of Lori Wimmer by influencing Alta Wimmer to reject continued
resuscitation efforts for her daughter during an emergency situation. The evidence for this
causal link came from at least three witnesses: (1) Dr. Ginsberg, plaintiffs neurology
expert; (2) Teresa Moore, Lori's sister; and (3) Dr. Pandita's own Death Summary
record.
1. Dr. Ginsberg.
During Dr. Ginsberg's testimony at trial, he made an explicit connection between
Lori's death and the negligence of Dr. Peterson:
A. My opinion is that there was a breach of the standard of care by
Dr. Peterson that indirectly resulted in a very negative feeling for ...
Lori's mom when they were asked by Dr. Pandita whether or not they
should do a tracheostomy or attempt to put the breathing tube back in.
I think there was a breach of the standard of care there that indirectly
resulted in Alta Wimmer stopping the resuscitation where it was. And
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I think had Dr. Peterson gone to Dr. Pandita before that meeting and said,
wait, this is too early, really, to do anything. We need to keep everything
going and I want to tell the family we can't make any prognosis and we're
certainly not going to give the kind of grim prognosis that was given, where
there was a reference to vegetable and vegetative state.

(R. 4310 at p. 468, 11. 8-23.) (Emphasis added.)
Dr. Ginsberg went on to reiterate his opinion that Dr. Peterson's advice adversely
impacted the decision to halt resuscitation as follows:

Q. Did you read in the depositions the word "vegetable" had been used?
A. Yes.
Q. Vegetative -A. Yes.
Q. And tell the jury with regard to those terms, what is the connotation,
you've talked to patients and families about -- that are in deep trouble. What
are those terms -- how do you see them being used?
A. First of all, they're pejorative terms that no doctor should use. I mean
nobody with any sensitivity wants to hear that their loved one is going to be
a vegetable. Persistent vegetative state has been talked a lot about in the
public. I prefer, if I'm talking to a family, to tell them, if it's true that
recovery is very unlikely, I will say that. And that there's any range of
possibility that the person could become dependent or have a very bad
outcome, but I certainly wouldn't use those terms of persistent vegetative
state or vegetable or mentally retarded. I just don't think that's part of the
medical or neurological lingo.
Q. And I understand you have to accept the testimony that you've read as
true,
but assuming that those terms are used, how do you think it would have
an impact on the overall care and treatment of Lori?
A. Yes, I think it adversely impacted the subsequent decision to halt
resuscitation.
Q. Okay.
A. And also to not do a cricothyroidotomy or tracheostomy.
(R. 4310 at p. 469, I. 8 top. 470, I. 15.) (Emphasis added.)
At the end of his direct examination, Dr. Ginsberg explained what Dr. Peterson
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should have done rather than tell Lori's family that she had a very poor prognosis:
A. Well, as I said, I think what would have been appropriate was to have
told
the family that many patients with this condition can recover. Some patients
recover within three to four days, some patients can take as long as ten to
14 to 21 days to recover. There's a bell curve here in the middle of the bell
curve is, you know, a recovery time of four or five days out along the
distant part of the bell curve, 20 days, maybe some patients who have very
light coma recover faster. But I think that what was not told to the family
was that the outcome here is potentially very good and we should continue
to support Lori.
(R. 4310 at p. 471, 11. 4-17.)
Dr. Ginsberg also testified that Lori was "eminently salvageable" on September 8,
that she just needed more time to recover, and that there was a "very good chance that she
would eventually wake up and probably leave the hospital." (R. 4310 at p. 456, 1. 1; p.
460, 11. 11-17.)
Thus, in his trial testimony, Dr. Ginsberg established the required causal link
between Alta Wimmer's decision to stop Lori's resuscitation and the negligent advice of
Dr. Peterson, Lori's neurologist. His evidence was sufficient to create a jury question.
Even though Dr. Ginsberg said that Dr. Peterson's advice "indirectly" caused
Lori's death, that does not defeat plaintifrs proximate cause case. First, Dr. Ginsberg's
perception of what is a "direct" cause may differ from the jury's. Expert witness
~

testimony can be helpful on the issue of proximate cause, but it cannot usurp the jury's
role. Dr. Peterson certainly had a direct, face-to-face conversation with Alta about Lori's
poor prognosis. As a result of that conversation, Alta stopped further resuscitation efforts.
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A reasonable jury could conclude that such a conversation was a direct cause of Lori's
death.
Second, even if Dr. Peterson's advice to Alta was not a direct cause of Lori's
death, it "set in motion events that produced the harm in a natural and continuous

sequence" by causing Alta to make the decision to halt resuscitation efforts based on the
erroneous idea that Lori had no meaningful chance for recovery. It is natural and
reasonable for lay persons such as Alta Wimmer to rely on the advice of a neurologist in
determining whether a family member is going to awaken from a coma, and if they have
a good chance of having a normal life. This is precisely the advice Dr. Peterson
conveyed, according the plaintifrs trial witnesses, i.e., Alta, Teresa, Dr. Ginsberg, and Dr.
Pandita.
2.

Teresa Moore.

Teresa Moore (Lori's sister) testified at trial that Dr. Pandita suggested a
tracheotomy to provide an airway for Lori, but that Alta Wimmer rejected the suggestion
because she understood her daughter was already irreversibly brain injured, i.e., likely to
end up in a persistent vegetative state. Teresa testified as follows:
Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.

Do you recall anything about - asking about a tracheotomy? Do you
recall anything about that?
He had talked to my mom about it.
When was that?
I - I can't recall. I'm sorry. I think it was before. I'm sorry, I'm
really trying.
That's okay. As best as you can recall is all you can do.
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Q.
A.
Q.
A.

•

And tell us as best as you recall what you recall hearing.
That she was too swollen for them to get it down her throat and that
they had to go through and make a hole. And Did your mom ask any questions in there?
My mom said, "Well, what good will that do?"
And he said, "Nothing. It won't change anything. She'll still be a
vegetable."

(R. 4311 atp. 625, 1. 18 top. 626, 1. 15.)
3.

Dr. Pandita's Death Summary.

Despite repeated denials on the stand at trial, Dr. Pandita's Death Summary
explicitly described the details of the family conference with Alta and Teresa and
specifically stated that Dr. Peterson felt Lori "could end up in a persistent vegetative
state." The relevant excerpt of the Death Summary reads as follows:
The family arrived meanwhile and we had a family conference,
which included the mother and sister of the patient, the social worker,
Brenda, Dr. Petersen [sic], and myself. Since Dr. Petersen [sic] had been
following the patient closely over the course of several days, he felt that
there was a progressive deterioration in her neurological status ... He felt
that the prognosis was very poor, and the patient could end up in a
persistent vegetative state."
(Defendant's Exhibit 1, at 000338.) (Emphasis added.)
Dr. Pandita, in his trial testimony, admitted to writing the foregoing words in his
Death Summary. (R. 4310 at 403.)
Thus, plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence by the testimony of 3 witnesses to
establish that Dr. Peterson's substandard medical advice regarding the condition of Lori's
brain, delivered as Lori's neurologist, was "a cause" of Alta's decision to give up on
resuscitation efforts for Lori. Accordingly, the question of proximate cause was for the
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jury, and should not have been the subject of a directed verdict by the trial court.

III.

The Court Erred in Denying a New Trial Because It
Committed an Error of Law Regarding General Damages.
A new trial may be granted for several enumerated reasons, including "error in

law." Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(7).
Plaintiffs reason for requesting a new trial was because the directed verdict on
general damages was an "error oflaw." If the appellate court agrees that it was error to
grant directed verdict on general damages (see Argument, Point I, supra), then a new trial
should also be granted due to this error in law.
The trial court's application of an improper standard while considering the issue of
directed verdict was demonstrated by several comments made from the bench during oral

•

argument:
1.

"Thanks for dying. It hurts. I'm sad. But it's the best result for everybody."

(R. 4313, atp. 35, 11. 21-22.)
2.

"There's no positive inference at all. I mean there's nothing positive in this

relationship." (R. 4313, at p.35, 1. 24-25.)
3.

"[M]om and dad walk out with crocodile tears and all this money." (R.

4313, at p. 38, 11. 4-5."
4.

"But this is an in-your-face argument, and it's not being taken very well by

this Court. I'm indulging it. I'll take it. But I'm telling you, you're out of order and
you're offensive and you don't need to be .... But the way you're presenting it, it's
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like-the Court's either going to just be shamed into adopting your-or it will dig in its
heels and say to heck with you. I don't care how good your argument is." (R. 4313, at p.
25 1. 22 top. 26, 1. 8.)
5.
(t

"[T]hat child has been nothing but a source of frustration, expense, anger

and heartbreak to that parent. ... now this child who has been strung out on dope and
drugs and crime for 25 years is now in the hospital, the victim of some wrongful act."
(R. 4313, at p. 28, 11. 7-9, 18-20.
It would be appropriate for the trial court's error in law to be rectified on appeal.
IV.

The Court Erred in Admitting Evidence that Lori Left
The Hospital on September 1 Against Medical Advice.
A.

The Intervening Negligent Acts of Drs. Pandita and Peterson
Broke the Chain of Proximate Cause for Lori's Actions.

Utah courts apply the doctrine of intervening negligent act, also known as

e

superseding cause. "An intervening cause is an independent event, not reasonably
foreseeable, that completely breaks the connection between fault and damages." Breton

v. Clyde Snow & Sessions, 2013 UT App 65, ,r 9 299 P.3d 13. The court can decide as a
matter oflaw whether an intervening act breaks the chain of causation. "[A]lthough
intervening cause inquiries are typically fact-intensive, they too can be decided as a
matter of law." Id. at ,r 10. This doctrine relieves a party from liability when a
subsequent tortfeasor commits an unforeseeable negligent act causing harm different than
the harm caused by the first party. Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp., 820 P.2d
482, 487-488 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
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In determining foreseeability, Utah law advises that "the appropriate inquiry
focuses on the specifics of the alleged tortious conduct, such as whether the specific

mechanism ofthe harm could be foreseen." Dee v. Johnson, 2012 UT App 237,, 5,286
P.3d 22 (internal quotations omitted; emphasis in original.)
In this case, the specific mechanism of harm to Lori at the time of her death on
September 8, 2004 was much different from the high blood sugar and diabetic
ketoacidosis (DKA) for which she went to the emergency room on September 1 and
September 2. The mechanism of harm on September 8, which caused Lori's death, was
Dr. Pandita's mismanaged extubation and intubation, during which he was "fussing
around" with a bronchoscope rather than quickly removing Lori's breathing tube and
bagging her, when he discovered that the tube was sending air to her stomach rather than
her lungs. (See Facts.)
Essentially, the mechanism of Lori's death on Sept. 8 was asphyxiation with a
tube in her throat, not any sort of disease process she had on September 1 or 2.
This type of death at the hands of a doctor was unforeseeable, even to other
doctors. Dr. Hasleton (the doctor who noted Lori's departure against medical advice)
testified that he never warned patients about the possible risk of death at the hands of a
health provider:
Q.

A.

As I understand it, of the risks that you told [Lori] about, one of the
risks that you did not include was that she was- by leaving, was
risking substandard care, substandard medical care in the future, you
didn't tell her that, did you? ...
It's not written.
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Q.

A.

Is that one of the normal complications of hyperglycemia,
substandard medical care? ... You told her the normal risks ... But
you dido 't tell her that one of the known complications or
anticipated risks was injury or death at the hands of the health
provider, did you?
That's not a complication I tell anybody.

(R. 4309 at p. 114, 11. 3-25.) (Emphasis added.)
Moreover, Dr. Pandita noted that Lori's diabetic ketoacidosis (DK.A) "had
completely resolved" by September 7. (Defendants' Exhibit 1 at 000338.) Thus, the
specific mechanism of harm related to her departure-namely her diabetic issues-had
"completely resolved" by Dr. Pandita's own admission, and could not play a part in the
later harm he caused by with the medical instruments he was using.
Finally, Lori was unconscious, in a coma, and incapable of purposeful movement
on September 8. She could not have been at fault for any action she took in relation to
her condition on September 8. One might just as well attribute fault to any unconscious
entity.
In other words, it was true that Lori was treated for a disease-diabetes-on
September 1st and again on September 2 nd , but it was Dr. Pandita's negligent use of
medical instruments-misplaced breathing tubes, bronchoscopes, bag masks-that cut
off the air to Lori on September 8 and caused her death.
Thus, Dr. Pandita's unforeseeable negligence, involving a different specific
mechanism of harm, broke the chain of proximate causation arising from Lori's
September 1st ER departure. As a result, admission of evidence about her departure was
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error, and merits reversal.

B.

Utah Follows the Majority Rule: A Patient's
Pre-Treatment Negligent Conduct Does Not
Excuse the Doctor's Negligent Treatment~

Essentially, the defendants wish to blame Lori for her pre-treatment conduct,
namely walking out of the hospital against another doctor's advice, and getting sick, 8
days before Dr. Pandita's botched re-intubation.
The Utah Supreme Court has rejected this theory. The Utah Supreme Court was
asked to answer the following certified questions from the US District Court:
(1) whether, under Utah law, the negligent acts of a plaintiff in causing or
contributing to the situation that the plaintiff hired a professional to
resolve can be the basis for a comparative or contributory negligence
defense, and (2) whether, under Utah law, a plaintiffs negligent acts in
causing or contributing to the situation the plaintiff hired a professional
to resolve can be considered in determining causation and damages. We
answer both questions "no."

Steiner Corp. v. Johnson & Higgins, 2000 UT 21,, 1,996 P.2d 531. (Emphasis added.)

•
•

The Steiner Court held as follows, citing the specific example of doctors:
[W]e conclude that a preexisting condition that a professional is called
upon to resolve cannot be the cause, either proximate or direct, of the
professional's failure to exercise an appropriate standard of care in fulfilling
his duties. To decide otherwise would allow professionals to avoid
responsibility for the very duties they undertake to perform. See Steiner II,
135 F .3d at 692. A doctor, for example, might be able to avoid liability
for negligently treating an injured person because the patient
negligently had run a traffic light and was injured. Such a result would be
clearly unsound.

Steiner, 2000 UT 21 at, 7. (Emphasis added.)
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The Utah Supreme Court's reasoning follows the majority rule regarding
pre-treatment conduct. The Oregon Court of Appeals recently set forth the majority rule:
" ... In sum, given that the focus in medical malpractice claims is on the
negligent acts or omissions of the medical provider, it is inappropriate to
use the patient's negligence that led to the condition that required
medical attention to excuse the defendants' failure to meet the accepted
standard of care. A patient who negligently injures himself is
nevertheless entitled to subsequent nonnegligent medical treatment,
and, if it is not provided, the patient is entitled to recover damages for the
consequences of that negligence ....
. . . [O]ur conclusion is that the plaintiffs action must relate to the
negligent treatment because, as a matter of law, conduct that merely
creates the need for medical treatment cannot cause the type of harm
at issue in medical malpractice cases-the injury resulting from the
malpractice....
Our conclusion is in line with the majority of other jurisdictions
that have dealt with this issue.... [T]he defense is inapplicable when a
patient's conduct provides the occasion for medical attention, care, or
treatment which later is the subject of a medical malpractice claim or when
the patient's conduct contributes to an illness or condition for which the
patient seeks the medical attention, care, or treatment on which a
subsequent medical malpractice claim is based."
Son v. Ashland Community Healthcare Services, 239 Ore. App. 495,244 P.3d 835, 843-

844 (Or. App. 2010) (internal quotations, ellipses and citations omitted),
In the present case, Lori's departure from Cottonwood Hospital's Emergency
Department on September 1 constituted pre-treatment activity which Drs. Pandita and
Peterson are barred by law from attributing to Lori. Therefore, it was legal error to admit
~

such evidence, and the trial court's ruling should be reversed.

C.

Lori Cannot Be Held Comparatively Negligent Because
Her Negligence Is Not Causally Connected to Her Injury.
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Comparative negligence can be employed as a defense only if that negligence is
"causally connected" to the injury. Steiner Corp. v. Johnson & Higgins, 2000 UT 21,, 1,
996 P .2d 531. See, Acculog, Inc. v. Peterson, 692 P .2d 728, 730 (Utah 1984). See also,
Matthews v. Williford, 318 So.2d 480,483 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1975) (holding that a
patient's conduct in contributing to his heart attack was not the "proximate cause" of the
patient's death); Jensen v. Archbishop Bergan Mercy Hosp., 236 Neb. 1,459 N.W.2d 178,
186 ( 1990) (holding that the patient's negligence must have been "an active and efficient
contributing cause of the injury"); Boeke v. International Paint Co. (Cal.), Inc., 27 Wash.
App. 611,620 P.2d 103 (1980); Kennedy v. City ofSawyer, 228 Kan. 439,618 P.2d 788
(1980).
"Proximate cause is 'that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence ...
produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred."' Bansasine v.
Bodell, 927 P.2d 675, 676 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Utah courts have consistently

•

recognized that a "more recent negligent ... act may ... relieve the liability of a prior
negligent actor under the proper circumstances (citations omitted). These circumstances
arise when the more recent negligent ... act was unforeseeable to the first negligent
actor." Id., at 677.
Simply put, Lori's death by a botched re-intubation on September 8th was not
within the foreseeable risk of leaving the emergency room on September 1st • See
Bansasine at 678. "Injuries have countless causes, and not all should give rise to legal

•
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liability" (citing W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts§ 42, at 273
(5th ed.1984)). Instead, "'the law ... declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain
point."' (quoting Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y.
1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting); Fordham v. Oldroyd, 2001 UT 74, ,r 30, 171 P.3d 411
~

(Wilkins , J ., concurring and dissenting).
Proximate cause is a legal limit to liability, "which precludes recovery for a
negligent act that may be part of a chain of events eventually leading to an injury, but still
[is] too remote to warrant holding the negligent party liable for the injury." Proctor v.

Costco Wholesale Corp., 2013 UT App 226, ,r 13,311 P.3d 564.
The conduct of Lori Wimmer on September 1st is too remote, both in time and in
~

mechanism of action, from the actions taken by Dr. Pandita on September 8th · While Lori
had a disease involving high blood sugar, which may have been affected by her departure
@

from the hospital, Lori's error was a sin of omission. By contrast, Dr. Pandita's errors
were sins of commission and did not involve a disease process, they involved medical
equipment that he did not use properly. He removed Lori's breathing tube too soon. He
attempted to re-intubate Lori in a negligent manner. He belatedly realized the tube was
misplaced in her esophagus. He failed to immediately remove the misplaced tube and get
oxygen back to Lori's brain. More importantly, Dr. Pandita's errors caused death to Lori
in a matter of minutes. It was prejudicial error for the court to allow such evidence to be
available to the jury.
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As the defendants have pointed out, in Harding v. Bell, the jury apportioned fault
to the plaintiff due to her comparative negligence in failing to heed Dr. Bell's medical
advice, engaging in the strenuous activity of cleaning horse stalls, and subsequently
suffering a coronary artery problem. 2002 UT 108, 1 10, 57 P .3d 1093.
However, the important distinction between Harding and Lori's case is that the

Harding case involved post-treatment conduct relative to the negligent physician sued,
whereas Lori's case involves pre-treatment conduct relative to the negligent doctors. In
other words, Ms. Harding disregarded the advice of her treating physician, then turned
around and sued him (i.e., Dr. Bell, who warned her about strenuous exertion, and whom
she disregarded). In Lori's case, by contrast, she had nothing to do with Dr. Hasleton,
who said she left against his medical advice. She has not claimed he was negligent, she
has not sued him, she has left him alone.
[S]ufficient evidence was introduced at trial to support the jury's conclusion
that she was negligent. Specifically, the evidence admitted at trial showed
that Harding knew of both the "abnormal" results from the ETT and the
scheduled appointment with the cardiologist. The trial record further
demonstrates that although Harding subsequently experienced "chest pain,"
including an "episode of ... severe ... chest discomfort," she waited
several days before seeking medical attention and engaged in the strenuous
physical activity of cleaning horse stalls. By itself, this evidence is
sufficient to support the jury's finding that Harding was negligent.
Harding's claim that there was insufficient evidence to find her negligent is
therefore without merit.

Id., at ,I 13.
Ms. Harding's damages were apportioned with those of her original treating
doctor, not a subsequent treating physician who engaged in some intervening act of
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negligence, as the facts here indicate. Perhaps the Harding case would be a defense for
the emergency room doctor (Hasleton), but neither Dr. Pandita nor Dr. Peterson treated
Lori Wimmer on September 1st in the ER.
This distinction between pre-treatment conduct and post-treatment conduct is
i>

consistent with the majority rule enunciated in the Steiner and Son cases. Patients cannot
be apportioned fault for getting sick. They are entitled to non-negligent medical
treatment, even if they were negligent in creating the situation that called for medical
treatment. However, if they fail to obey a doctor's orders, they cannot turn around and
sue that doctor without taking their share of fault.
V.

The Court Erred in Striking Charles
Landers, M.D. As a Rebuttal Expert.
A.

Dr. Landers Is a Proper Rebuttal Witness under Utah Law.

The trial court erred in holding that Dr. Landers' testimony was not proper
rebuttal testimony and was cumulative of plaintiffs other experts.
Rebuttal evidence is evidence tending to refute, modify, explain, or otherwise
minimize or nullify the effect of the opponent's evidence. Board ofEducation v. Barton,
617 P.2d 347,349 (Utah 1980). In Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1993) the court
ordered a new trial, stating that the testimony of an expert witness was "proper rebuttal
Qi}

evidence because its purpose was to minimize the effect of [opposing party's expert
testimony] and undermine the bases of his conclusions." Id., at 1338.
Rebuttal evidence should be limited to evidence made necessary by the
opponent's case-in-reply and evidence required to counter new facts
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presented in the defendant's case-in-chief. The purpose of rebuttal evidence
is not merely to contradict or corroborate evidence already presented but to
respond to new points or evidence first introduced by the opposing party.
Astill v. Clark 956 P.2d 108lat 1086 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).

Both Randle and Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62, 29 P.3d 638 looked to Workman v.
Henrie, 71 Utah 400,266 P. 1033, 1036 (Utah 1928) in opining that: "As a general rule,

testimony presented for the purpose of rebuttal should be admitted, even if the rebuttal
is somewhat repetitive of testimony on issues addressed during the case-in-chief." Randle,
atl338 citing, Workman v. Henrie, 71 Utah 400, 266 P. 1033, 1036 (Utah 1928); Green,
at if 23. (Emphasis added.)
In Green, "[the Defendant's expert's] testimony was offered to explain and
minimize the effect of [Plaintifr s expert 's] testimony ... [and] was an important factor in
the reconstruction of the accident. The testimony was not offered to rehash or repeat
[Plaintifrs expert's] testimony. Even if somewhat repetitive, it was proper." Id.
In Turner v. Nelson, 872 P .2d 1021 (Utah 1994), the court refused to admit the
testimony of a rebuttal witness. The court's refusal to admit the rebuttal testimony in
Turner differs from the present case because in Turner the appellant was attempting to

admit evidence from an undisclosed witness. "The trial court excluded the testimony
because it would unfairly disadvantage the defendant who had no notice of or opportunity
to depose the surprise witness" Astill v. Clark 956 P.2d 1081, 1085 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
"When the offering party contends that the undisclosed witness is necessary to
rebut the adverse party's evidence, the issue hinges on whether the evidence 'sought to be
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rebutted could reasonably have been anticipated prior to trial'." (Emphasis in original.)
Turner, at 1024.
The facts here indicate that Dr. Landers was disclosed in the Disclosure of Expert
Witnesses document filed by Plaintiff on June 15, 2009. Astill also distinguishes Turner
in regard to expert witnesses who have been fully disclosed. "The elements of unfair
prejudice and surprise associated with undisclosed witnesses are clearly not at issue
[t]here." Id, at 1085 .

•

Thus, Astill stands for the proposition that a party needs to reasonably anticipate,
prior to trial, the testimony of her opposing party that will need to be rebutted and arrange
for, and disclose to that opponent, to the expert who will testify. Here, Plaintiff did just
that. She anticipated what rebuttal witnesses would be needed to counter defendant's
experts, and rightfully named Dr. Landers as one of them, long before trial.

•

B.

Dr. Landers' Testimony Is Not Cumulative.

Dr. Landers' testimony is not "needlessly cumulative" under Evidence Rule 403.
"The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially

•

outweighed by a danger of ... needlessly presenting cumulative evidence." Utah R. Evid.
403.

It is the nature of rebuttal evidence that it addresses issues previously testified to in
the case in chief of one or both parties. Its probative value is essential to plaintiffs case,
not outweighed by a danger of being "needlessly" cumulative. Were it to be characterized
at all as cumulative it would be needfully so in order to repeat and explain why an issue,
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previously argued by both plaintiff and defense, should be decided for plaintiff rather
than for the defense.
Dr. Landers' opinion is that Dr. Peterson misled the Wimmer family when he told
them that Lori's brain would not likely recover. He didn't distinguish between metabolic
encephalopathy and encephalopathy caused by hypoxia. The reason that Dr. Landers'
testimony was needed is that Dr. Peterson and Dr. Caplan, defendant's neurologist, have
disclosed that they will repeat this misleading information to the jury at trial. The jury
was entitled to hear Dr. Landers' opinion that the information was misleading and that
giving such misleading information to a family considering termination of resuscitation
efforts is a breach of the applicable standard of care. It is the nature of rebuttal testimony
that it addresses an issue previously addressed in the case in chief by one or both parties,
but it is not needlessly cumulative.
The trial court in refusing to allow Dr. Landers' rebuttal evidence stated that Drs.
Gins burg and Ali had already covered the same territory and thus it was cumulative.
Plaintiff is not required to do more through Dr. Ginsburg or Dr. Ali than establish a prima
facie case. See Astill at 1086. Plaintiff is not required in her case in chief to present a
"pre- buttal" every defense that defendant's experts can or will make, even if those
defenses are known to plaintiff. "[W]here a defendant introduces evidence of an
affirmative matter in defense ... , the plaintiff, as a matter of right, is entitled to
introduce evidence in rebuttal as to such affirmative matter." Id., at 1086.
In Astill the court cites Turner in stating that "[It] will not reverse the trial court
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unless the appellant demonstrates that the trial court has clearly abused its discretion and
thereby affected the appellant's substantial rights." Astill, at 1084, citing Turner, at 1023.
Here the trial court's actions have "affected the appellant's substantial rights."
Both when the trial court granted a directed verdict and then later refused to grant a new
El

trial, the plaintiff lost the opportunity present the jury with her "points or evidence first
introduced by the opposing party." Astill, at 1086. "Whether a defendant introduces
evidence of an affirmative defense or justification, plaintiff, as a matter of right, is
entitled to introduce evidence in rebuttal as to such affirmative matter." Astill, at 1086, 13
"Fundamental fairness requires that a party be permitted to introduce evidence to
rebut inferences the jury can draw from the opposing party's evidence." Astill, at 1087.

"The purpose of rebuttal evidence is not merely to contradict or corroborate
evidence already presented but to respond to new points or evidence first introduced by
the opposing party." Astill at 1086, (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (emphasis added)
Defendant Pandita contends that the opinions of Dr. Landers' "can serve only to
'contradict or corroborate evidence already present' as specifically proscribed by Astill.
However, this argument that Dr. Landers' testimony is repetitive of other expert
witness such as Doctors Ali and Ginsburg does not lead to exclusion by the trial court.
For if Dr. Landers' testimony had been admitted, the result might have been different.
"Even though evidence sufficient to support the verdict was presented at trial, had
[plaintiffs] rebuttal evidence been admitted, a different result may have been reached. As
such, the error was prejudicial" Astill, at 1087, 15-16
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Accordingly, Plaintiff requests that the rebuttal testimony of Dr. Landers be
allowed.
CONCLUSION

•

For the reasons stated in this brief, the Plaintiff/Appellant respectfully requests
that the Court reverse the trial court's two directed verdicts, its denial of a new trial, and
its evidentiary rulings, and this case be remanded for further proceedings.
r-JN.D
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this~-- day of October 2014.

MARTIN & PRITCHETT, P.A.

w all
Counsel for Defendants/Appellants
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Trial Transcript - Day Four

TERESA MOORE ,

1

•
•

2

called as a witness for and on behal f of the

3

plaintiff , being first duly sworn , was examined and

4

testified as follows :
THE COURT :

5
6

8

DIRECT EXAMINATION

•

12

Q.

And where do you live?

13

A.

In West Jordan , Utah .

14

Q.

And have you moved -- were you raised

16

A.

I was .

17

Q.

Tell us , who is the members of your

19
20

22

here?

immediate fami ly now?
A.

My husband Robert -MR . NEWHALL :

Your Honor , I ' m having

trouble hearing both the witness and the attorney .
THE COURT :

So am I .

23

because of the equipment .

24

closer to the microphone .

25

•

your full name , p lease .
Teresa Moo re.

21

•

For the record , Teresa, would you state

A.

18

•

Q.

11

15

•

BY MR . SCHLENDER :

9

10

Would you please sit in this

cha ir .

7

•

12/11 /2013

MR . SCHLENDER :

I don ' t think it ' s

If you could each stand

Thanks , Judge .

Is that

50 West Broadway
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12/11/2013

1

sometimes she'd just be a little off on how she was

2

talking or walking, and then you knew there was

3

something was going on with her.

4
5

6

Q.

So did you, after a period of time,

connect it up that it was --

A.

We did, then we knew when to -- if she was

7

having a problem, we knew how to act with it and what

8

to do for her.

9

Q.

What did you do?

10

A.

We'd get her a drink of orange juice, give

11

her some candy, and if she wasn't too -- if it wasn't

12

too bad, then she'd come out of it really quickly.

13
14
15

Q.

Were there times when she didn't come out

of it as quickly?

A.

No, it usually took us maybe about five

16

minutes or so to get her to snap out of it.

17

it would take a little bit longer.

Sometimes

18

Q.

Was Lori married?

19

A.

For a short time.

20

Q.

And she had -- was Megan her only child?

21

A.

She was.

22

Q.

And in 2004, where was Lori living?

23

A.

At my mom's.

24

Q.

And with Megan?

25

A.

Yes.

l
lA--S

.

. ,,

.
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1

Q.

With your mom?

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

And your mom is Alta, sitting here in the

4

•

courtroom?

5

A.

Yes .

6

Q.

I want to just ask you now about the

7

•

12/11/2013

events that occurred there in that week in September.

8

A.

Okay.

9

Q.

On September 2nd when she went to the

10

hospital, what do you remember about that?

11

talk to her at all?

Did you

I?

12

A.

I talked to her that morning.

13

Q.

That morning?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

And what did -- what was the context of

17

A.

I was just asking her how she was feeling.

18

Q.

Okay.

19

A.

She said she wasn't feeling really good.

20

Q.

Okay.

21

A.

So I was done working for the morning so I I}

16

that?

And what did she say?

i

22

told her I'd come over and -- to help her so -- you

23

know, so I could help her feel better.

24

Q.

Was she going to go to work that day?

25

A.

No.
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1

Q.

The whole day on the 3rd?

2

A.

I did .

3

Q.

We re there other family members besides

4

A.

My mom, she came i n sho rtly after I did .

6

My husband came for a few mi nutes .

7

anybody else .

Q.

8

10
11

•

yo u t hat we re t here t hat da y ?

5

9

And I don ' t recall

Was there a waiting room there or a place

that you coul d go , or did you just have to stay in - her

A.

13

to leave f or .
Q.

•

You might slow down a little bit , let me

finish my

16

A.

Okay , sorry .

17

Q.

-- question .

•
Just take your time .

You were there the whole day .

18
19

•

We just stayed in her room , unless they

told u s they were doing somethi ng with her that we had

15

•

room?

12

14

•

Did you eat

•

lunch there?

20

A.

We didn ' t leave for l u nch .

21

Q.

You didn ' t leave?

22

A.

Huh-uh , no .

23

Q.

Did you see any of the doctors that day?

24

A.

We did .

25

Q.

Do you recall who you saw?

•
•
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1

A.

I don't.

2

Q.

Okay.

3

12/11/2013

Was there any conversation at all

about Lori that you can specifically recall?

4

A.

With the doctor?

5

Q.

Yeah.

6

A.

I was trying to understand why she was on

7

a respirator and this particular doctor said he didn't 1~

8

know why she was on a respirator either, that she was

~

i
~

9

10
11

l

just sick and just needed to wake up.
Q.

Okay.

i

this is the

And during the day

day after she's initially there; right?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

At night?
Was there anything unusual occurred that

14

,,
I,'

15

you recall at all with regard to Lori, her condition

16

or anything that happened?

I••

17

A.

Just that they had taken her off the

18

medication to get her to wake up and all she was doing

19

was kicking her arms around and her legs.

20

eyes were opened but they were -- they were kind of

21

going up to the top.

And her

22

Q.

Uh-huh.

23

A.

And that's all she was doing.

24

Q.

Okay.

25

A.

They had her tied down when she would do

Was she in any way tied down?

c
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1

that because she would grab for the -- they were

2

grabbing

3

Q.

Grabbing for the respirator?

4

A.

Yes .

5

Q.

The tube or --

6

A.

The tube, uh-huh, yes .

7

Q.

Okay .

8
9

10

A.

•

she was grabbing for the respirator .

from happening?

•

And so how did they prevent that
What was there, what did the y use?

Just these tie - downs they wrapped around

Q.

And were they doing that th a t day on the

13

A.

Yes .

14

Q.

So come that even i ng , you went home,

15
16

3rd?

•
I

gather?
A.

Well, I stayed until I had to go to my

17

crossing and then I came back after my crossing was

18

over with, then stayed until about 7 : 00.

19

Q.

You came back after what?

20

A.

After my crossing .

21

•

each wrist and then around each of her ankles .

11
12

•

I ' m a crossing guard

•

•

and I cross in the morning and in the afternoon .

22

Q.

Okay .

23

A.

Yes .

24

Q.

What is that?

25

A.

It ' s where you go out to the stop sign and

A guard crossing?

•

•
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1

•

~l

we ' re talking about , do you think?

:J

2

A.

I don ' t know .

3

Q.

Okay .

4

•

12/11 /20 13

5

I didn ' t see the video, no .

And , anyway, they were having a

And he told him what the numbers were.

6

And Dr . Pandit a j us t said ,

7

was done .

11

We 11 ,

11

!
l

~

~

conversation about the respirator?

A.

.l

and that I s a 11 that

~
~

i
l

~

Dr . Pandita didn ' t go -- neither

~

•

8

Dr. Pandita or the other gentleman went into any

9

questions about the numbers that the therapist had

10
11

•

12

•
•
•
•
•

just given t h em .

Q.

Okay .

Was your mother there with you at

that time?

13

A.

She was .

14

Q.

Okay .

15

!,:

Were you two togethe r most of the

time when you were there at the hospital?

16

A.

We were .

17

Q.

Could you -- was there any way you could

18

take a break and you could go outside , anything of

19

that kind?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

Did you do that occasionally?

22

A.

We did .

23

Q.

Was it close by?

24

could go out?

25

A.

Was there a door you

It was at the end of the hall from where

rA=-i l

50 West Broadway, Suite 900 , Salt Lake City, UT 84 101

TH ACKF.R ·+(::J

Page 600

Trial Transcript - Day Four

1

Q.

2

arrived?

3

A.

•

l

•

And was -- anyone e ls e that

{

My mom .

l'

,I

Q.

4
5

Okay.

12/11 /20 13

Okay .

And what do you remember -- I want

you to just very carefully take us through the events

j

~

i

j

Ii

6

~

now .

;
J

What do you remember , the first thing of

7
8

any importance with regard to Lori , that you recollect

9

happening?

10

A.

•
She started moving on her own and I was

11

absolutely excited .

12

just said -- I yelled at the nurse , I said for her to

13

come here.

I walked out to the nurse and I

14

And she came down and she said , "What? "

15

And I said, " Loo k , look , she ' s moving on

16

he r own .

17

eyes are open ."

18

so exciting ."

I said , " Look what she ' s doing, it ' s

She goes , "Well , I took her down off the
medicine ."

21

Q.

She said what?

22

A.

She said , " I ' ve taken down the medicine . "

23

Q.

They had taken down the medicine?

24

A.

Yeah , they had gone and brought down the

25

•

I said , "Look , her arms are moving, her

11

19
20

•

•
•

medicine and they ' d been doing it every day to try to

~-"·-' ' · "-',;.t;;.c .....-,, .. •,

.,;;J.
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1

•
•
•

•
•
•

•

•
•

~=

12/1 1/2013

fine if we took her off the respirator .
..___,.·

2

Q.

All right .

3

A.

And he was so -- ma king u s feel so secure

4

with that decision t h at we didn 't feel at that time

5

that we needed t o call my brothers.

6

Q.

You didn ' t need to cal l them?

7

A.

No , because he mad e us fe e l l i ke she was

8

going to be fine , that there wou l d -- I didn ' t

9

want something to happen to her a nd it be on my mom ' s

10

shou lders a nd my s h oulders .

11

happen to my little sister , I wanted my brothe r s to be

12

invo l ved in t h i s ma j or decis i on on my sister ' s life .

13

And he gave e very indication that she was going to be

14

fine

If something were to

I)

15

Q.

Okay .

16

A.

-- when she was be i ng taken off t h e

17

-

:

11

'

resp i rator .

18

Q.

19

happened then?

20

A.

All r i ght .

So what did t h ey do -- what

So my mom said , "Well , if you feel like

21

that is the best thi ng to be doing for Lori and you ' re

22

making us fee l so comfortable with what you ' re saying ,

23

then go ahead ."

24

Q.

Okay.

And so what happened?

25

A.

He said it would be a little bit before

, . ~- -

• J . ...........

•
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•

12/ 11 /2013
j

i

1

•I

t ube gone?

1
!

2

A.

It was gone .

3

Q.

Okay .

-·-·

i

¾

How · did Lori appear at this time?

t

•

I

1,
.!
j

4

A.

She was moving her arms all over , her legs

5

all ove r , and she had this horrible breathing sound .

6

It was just -- I can ' t even re al ly explain it , it was

7

just really a deep -- almost li ke she was gasping for

8

air , and i t was just really hard .

9

Q.

Was there any doctors in the room then?

10

A.

No .

11

Q.

Nurses?

12

A.

No .

13

Q.

Okay .

15

A.

Yes .

16

Q.

Okay .

18

,t

•

1

•

•

She came in probably about 15 minutes

And s he ' s breathing this way?

And what happened when -- did

!

•

somebody come in or what?

A.

Well , I asked the nurse why she was

19

breathing like that and she said , "That's the way that

20

they always sound when you take out a " -- take the

21

!

after we ' d got back into the room .

14

17

l

;
1

:1
I·;

•

1'1

11

r espirator out .

1l

I

22

And I had said to h er -- wi t h her being a

23

diabetic , I asked her if she could give her something

24

to calm her down just a little bit to relax her

25

because I was concerned o f her organs being affected

- . -· ..... -.
~

-

\

•

l

y---·

•
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1

by bei n g a diabetic .

12/11/2013

And she said that they cou ld not

J
"

J
('

··--

2

do that ,

3

Q.

4

•
•

5

6

•
•

She was just thrashing over -- t hrash i ng

so hard , and they had her arms down .

8

A.

They were restrained and her legs , but she

9

wa s just pulling so hard and she was bring ing her head
up really hard and just hitting it back down.

And I

11

''
was just concerned being diabetic that it could affect ~1

12

her organs .

~

And the nurse said that -- I said,

13

" Well,

how l ong could this happen? "
And she said ,

15

" For about 24 hours ."

16

Q.

She said

17

A.

That she could be breathing and thrashing

18

around like that for about 24 hours .

19

said to her , " Why didn 1 t

20

what we were going to be in for so we were prepared on

21

what we were going to be see i ng with Lori? "

23

Q.

Okay .

And so I just

anybody tell u s that this is

And she didn ' t

22

25

•

A.

1

What was happening to he r?

They were restrained?

24

•

you talking about?

Q.

14

•

What were you concerned about , what are

7

10

•

~
~

it would defeat the purpose .

have an answer.

And at this time, who is t here,

just you and mom?
A.

Just my mom and myself , and the nurse

50 West Broadway, Suite 900, Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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1

Dr . Pandi ta , your mom .

Anyone else?

•

2

A.

J u st myself .

3

·Q .

Jus t

4

A.

Uh-huh , yes .

5

Q.

And Brenda?

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

Okay .

8

A.

Dr . Pandi ta looked over at my mom and he

9
10

•

12/11 /2013

you?

•

Tell us what happene d next .

told my mom that thing s we r e not going well for Lori
and t h at it wa s not l oo k in g good for her .

11

And I said to him,

" What h appene d ?

You

12

told us that she wou ld be fine .

13

don ' t understand how it changed so drastica l ly i n

14

those few minutes , we didn ' t understand .

15

What happened? "

•

I

And Dr. Peterson said that her brainwaves

16

were low and it didn ' t

look good and that in the state

17

that she ' s in r ight now , that she was either going to

18

be a vegetable or severely retarded .

1
!

•

And t hat came
i

19

from Dr . Pandita .

20

thing .

21

And then Dr . Peterson said the same

in a state of shock , so she was j ust kind of sitting

23

there shaking .

25

'

•

And I said , agai n - - my mom was more like

22

24

~

And I said , " I want somebody to tell me
what happened here , because you gave us your word that

•
i1
•'
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1

my sister was going to be fine .

2

how this has happened ."

3

explain yourself how this happened , I don ' t

4

understand ."

•

and shaking and crying .

7

everything was just not good with her and that this

8

was a state that she was going to be in , e i ther a

9

ve geta ble or s he was going to be severely retarded .
And you say -- who speci fically u sed those

12

A.

Dr . Pandita and Dr . Peterson .

13

Q.

Both d i d?

14

A.

They both did .

15

Q.

How about Brenda?

16

A.

Brenda did .

Brenda, at that time, she was

she was just holding my mom ' s hand and then

just

18

patting her on the le g .

19

lot at that time when the doctors were in there .
Okay .

Q.

Brenda wasn ' t sayi ng an awful

So Brenda didn ' t really say much at

\
1

l

~
11

I!
~

,\

that time?

22

A.

Not at that time .

23

Q.

Okay .

24

this meeting?

25

•

words?

17

21

•

And they just said tha t

Q.

20

1

And I said , " I want you to

6

11

•

I don ' t understand

·'
'I'

And my mom was still just sitting t h ere

5

10

•

12/11 /2013

A.

I·.
'

So how long did this go on ,

It l asted for a few .

They -- they asked
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1

my mom what she wanted to do and my mom said she

2

didn't know

......

3

Q.

Excuse me --

4

A.

-- what she wanted -- with the state that

5

Lori was in pertaining to the respirator, what they

6

wanted my mom to do.

My mom didn't know what --

7

Q.

They asked her that?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

Who did?

10

A.

Dr. Pandita.

11

Q.

Asked your mom what?

12

A.

About the respirator.

You say "they"?

And my mom said

13

that she didn't know what she wanted to do, because

14

she was just in a state of shock.

,'.,

u

And then Brenda said to her, "You wouldn't

15

16

want your daughter to live like that, Alta.

17

wouldn't want your daughter to be a vegetable or

18

severely retarded, you wouldn't want your daughter to

19

live like that."
And my mom said she wouldn't want her

20

21
22

23
24
25

You

daughter to live like that.
Q.

How is your mom doing at this point in

,~.

that conversation?
A.

I•;

My mom just kept shaking and crying, and I

~
1

just -- I just kept saying, "I just don't understand,

50 West Broadway, Suite 900, Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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1

compressions .

2

Q.

On her - - wi th her hands ?

3

A.

Yes .

her head.

5

over her mouth , down he r chin , and I was upset over

6

that and I wanted to know where the blood was coming

7

from , why she had blood on her .

8

h yste rica l and

9

Q.

12

•
•
•
•

And I was pretty

So what ha ppened ne xt?

When did you see

A.

I didn ' t s ee him at any time of that going

Q.

Did there come a time when he came to talk

on .

13

14

And she ha d blood all over her face , all

Dr . Pandita?

11

•

And t hen there was a gentleman above

4

10

•

12/11/2013

to you and your mother?

15

A.

Just my mother and I , no .

16

Q.

Just the two of you?

17

A.

No .

18

Q.

Do you recall anything about -- asking

19

about a tracheotomy?

20

that?

Do you recall anything about

21

A.

He had talked to my mom about it .

22

Q.

When was that?

23

A.

I -- I can ' t recall .

24

it was before .

25

Q.

I think

I ' m sorry , I ' m really trying .

That ' s okay .

50 West

I ' m sorry .

As best as you can recall is

jj{:.r~
I

Lake City, UT 84101
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•

.
1

!

all you can do .

2
3

A.

I
l

Did you hear that mentioned?

Ii

Yes .

j
.,

•

1j

~

4

Q.

That word?

5

A.

Yes .

6

Q.

And tell us as best as you recall what you ~1

7

j
~

A.

That she was too swol l en for t h em to get

I

it down her throat and that they had to go through and \~
l'I

10

make a hole .
Q.

Did your mom ask any questions in there?

12

A.

My mom said , "Well , what good will that

do? "

14
15

And he said , "No t hing .
anything .

It won ' t change

j

She ' ll still be a vegetable . "

16

Q.

Okay .

17

A.

We were just

18

,,

Lt

What happened then?
--

Rob were at the door , they were watching what was
happening .

20

the back, and my mom was -- my mom had gone al l the

21

way into t he room and she was over to the right ,

22

standing with the people .

23

hysterically and --

25

Q.

•

my niece Rachel and my son

19

24

•

And - -

11

13

•

J

recall hearing .

8
9

{

More of the family was standing towards

And my mom was crying

I!

I

•

I~

•

Was Lori at this time moving or doing

anything at all?

•

50 West Broadway, Suite 900, Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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~

•
•

I

r

1

A.

No .

2

Q.

So did anybody say anything about

l
{
,!

3

Lori ' s -- d id they give you any -- anybody make a

4

statement about what had happened now at t h is point?

5

Did they say, " She ' s dead " ?

6

A.

:~
,
?

l

No , they never said that she was dead .

7

mom had just -- she can ' t keep going through this ,

8

that Lori couldn ' t keep going through thi s .

9

of a sudden , eve rything just s topped , ever ybody

My

I

1

'

1i

J

•

10

•
•

•
e

•
•

Q.

r

l

~l

,!
~

stopped work ing on her .

11

12

And a l l

I
I

,!

Was there -- at this time when they

l

!
I

stopped , was there still blood all over her?

j

13

A.

There was .

14

Q.

And was the lady still up on top of her?

15

A.

She was starting to get off of her .

16

Q.

Starting to get off of her?

17

A.

Uh -h uh .

1)

l

After everything was starting to

18

stop , she got off for the ge ntl eman and they just told

19

us we needed to leave .

]

20

Q.

Okay.

21

A.

Yes.

)

22

Q.

What do you rec a l l next , anything?

i'

23

A.

They told us that -- that she was gone and

So did you?

i

l

'

24

we could see her again when they had her cleaned up so

25

we d idn 1 t see her like that .

·-

--·

-- ..

.......

.__.

."!,--

And so we we nt in the

-

50 West Broadway, Suite 900, Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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1

other room and just waited for her - - for them to

2

clean her up .

3

came in and told us that we could come back into the

4

room, and Dr . Pandita was i n there at the time .

5

they had said that he walked over and he checked he r

6

vitals and he said that there was still a small

7

heartbeat and asked my mom what she wanted to do .

8

my mom --

And so when they were all done they

And

•

Q.

He what?

10

A.

He asked my mom what she wanted him to do .

11

Q.

How long was it that you were gone whil e

14

A.

Probably a half hour or l ess maybe ,

something -- around a half hour .
Q.

15
16

•

they cleaned her up?

13

So this is -- and this is after that time

had expired?
A.

17

•

Yes , that was -- that she was completely

18

cleaned up and he just said there was a small

19

heartbeat .

20

Q.

So you came back?

21

A.

Uh-huh , yes.

22

Q.

Was Dr . Pandita in the room when you came

24

A.

He was .

25

Q.

And he told -- did he go over to Lori?

23

•

And

9

12

•

in?

_,.,
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1

2

He did.

He checked her and he said there

was still a small heartbeat, what would my mom like to

3

do, and my mom just said to -- after this length, to

4

let her go.

5

6

Q.

Was there any -- any other. personnel in

there, anybody at all?
No.

8

Q.

Was there any machines or trach tubes or

11

anything?

A.

No, everything was shut off and out of the

room, cleaned up.

12

Q.

Quiet?

13

A.

Quiet.

14

Q.

Lori was -- Lori's in the bed, as I

15

understand it.

16

A.

Just up to her -- up to her armpits.

17

Q.

Okay.

18

A.

We stayed with her and then came

Does she have a sheet over her?

And then what happened?

'

i

19

Dr. Pandita came back in and said that she was gone.

20

So we stayed with her for a little and went back into

21

the other room because Megan had not gotten there yet

22

and my husband hadn't made it in time.

23

back in the room and waited for them to come and then

24

told them that she was gone.

25

,,
"
1i

A.

10

1;

';

7

9

•

A.

12/11/2013

,,

1,:

So we went

So we took Megan and my husband and my

Page 630
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1

daughter and we went back into the room .

2

walked over to her and put her head on her chest and

3

just told her that she loved her and that she wished

4

she would wake up .

5

stay with her for a little while and then we left the

6

room .

8
9

10
11

That ' s all I have .

you .
THE COURT :

We ' ll take a recess now and - -

for about 10 or 15 minutes .

As we take a break , I ' d ask you , members

13

the case among yourselves , don ' t allow anyone else to

14

discuss the case with you .

•

Please rise for the jury .

15

(The jury exited the courtroom . )

16

THE COURT :

17

(A recess was taken . )

18

THE COURT :

19

Wimmer versus Pandita .

•

Court ' s in recess .

We are back on the record in
•

Ms . Moore , do you want to come back up?
Wh o would like --

22

MR . WRIGHT :

I ' ll --

23

THE COURT :

All right .

•

Mr . Wright.

CROSS EXAMINATION

24
25

•

We ' ll come back at 10 : 15 .

of the jury , not to form an opinion , do not discuss

21

•

Thank

12

20

•

And then we just - - let Megan just

MR . SCHLENDER :

7

And Megan

•

BY MR . WRIGHT :

t A;1-tz1o

•
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1

A.

Yeah , I don ' t recall anything e ls e .

11

2

Q.

Except what you ' ve already told us about?

.j

3

A.

Yes.

4

~

----

~

:1

!

MR . SCHLENDER :

i

I have no further

~

'j

5

\

questions .

•

J

6

THE COURT:

7

MS . BASSETT :

8

THE COURT:

Mr . Hobbs?

9

MR . HOBBS:

No questions .

10

THE COURT :

Ms . Garff, you may be excused .

Ms. Bassett?
No questions, Your Honor .

l
:l
i

1
~
l
?

11

~

•

l~

Thank you for being here .
MR . SCHLENDER :

12
13

~

We call to the stand Alta

Wimmer .

'

,,!

•

i
?.

:

THE COURT :

14

Ms . Wimmer , if you ' d come up

!
-~

15

'

and be sworn , please .
THE CLERK :

16

You do solemnly swear to tell

17

the truth , the whole truth , and nothing but the truth ,

18

so help you God?

1'·

'

J
-i
~

~

ij

l

ALTA WIMMER ,

19
20

called as a witness for and on behalf of the

21

plaintiff, being first duly sworn, was examined and

22

testified as follows :

,l

,.

'~
11
!

DIRECT EXAMINATION

23

;1
~

24
25

•
•

BY MR . SCHLENDER :
Q.

1

State your name , please.

i
3

.i
•

-

---~

-

_ .. .u•

-

.. ..

...

...

-

•
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1

A.

Well , they - - he indica ted that she was

2

doing as

you know , good, that she was doing fine

3

with -- everything looked good on h er .

Q.

Di d he use those words?

5

A.

It may not have been exactly those wo rds ,

•
•

•
•
•

'i

but to the - - to the point that we knew that he was

7

saying she wa s okay at that point .

9

I!
I

6

I
J

!

·,

Q.

Okay .

And did you have a conversation

with him at all that you recall?

10
11

•

l

4

8

•

12/ 11/2013

A.

f;
'/

J

I don ' t remember exactly what was said at

that particular time .

I know that we were -- my
11

12

daughte r aske d him a lot of questions and I kind of

13

liste ned more t han anything because I was

I was

,l

I';
I'

14

having a really rough time with her illnes s, with

15

he r

how bad of f she was .
I '.

16

Q.

What do you mean by

I

17

A.

Well , just the fact that she was in the

·';

18

ICU and sick .

19

Q.

20

I
i

.;

And when you say " your daughter , " which

daughter are you talking about?

21

A.

Teresa .

22

Q.

Teresa?

23

A.

Teresa , yes .

24

Q.

Was Teresa with you there that morning?

25

A.

Yes .

L -_:::::-:;;
__:;:;_::;;;~
_:;;--- - -- - -- - - - . : : - -- ---::-:---::::-- - - --

t

I•

'

!

- = = =;::;---:. l
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A.

1

2

12/11/2013

After -- yes , yes , in that little side

room .

l
1

Q.

3

•

i,,

Little side room?

·I

,,

4

A.

Uh - huh.

5

Q.

And tell us about that meeting .

I

4

6

What do

you recall?

A.

7

Well , like Teresa said , we ' d been outside

8

and we came back in and they said , "We ' ve been looking

9

for you , where were you? "

And we had told them where

10

we were going , went out to take a break and have a

11

sandwich because they ' d asked us to leave the room.

12

took us in that room, and that 's when they told us

14

that she was -- that she had taken a turn for the

15

worst and she was either going to be a vegetable or

16

retarded .

!

1

i
'
''

Who was it that --

18

A.

Both doctors said that to us .

19

Q.

Dr.

20

A.

Dr . Peterson and Dr . Pandita both told us

Q.

Is there any question i n your mind that

•

•
i

Q.

23

l

l
J

17

22

j

•

<

And -- and so when we came back in , they

13

21

i
1
J

•
•

that .

•

both of them said it?

24

A.

No .

25

Q.

What was your reply, what was your

•

~25
THACKE~
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1

•

•
•

•

•

•

A.

Oh , I was in a state of shock because it

3

had only been like half an hour since they to ld us

4

that s he was doing o kay .

5

Q.

And what did you say to h im?

6

A.

Well , I just

I just told him , " I don ' t

7

understand this , what could

8

quick , how things could happen to her so quickly . "

10

how she could turn so

And they didn ' t really -- they didn ' t

9

really say anything , to my recollection.

11

Q.

Okay .

12

A.

Yes .

13

Q.

And did the doctors stay in the room with

15

A.

No .

16

Q.

They left?

17

A.

Yes .

18

Q.

So they weren ' t there very long in this --

19

A.

No .

20

Q.

Did they say anything other than - - about

Now , was Brenda there at that time?

1

you?

No .

21

her condition other than that she could be a

22

vegetable?

23

A.

Not that I recall .

24

Q.

Did they ask you anything about this ,

25

•

response?

2

14

•

12/1 1/2013

about

50 W est Broadway, Su ite 900, Salt Lake City, UT 84101

Page 647

•

THACKER+C:o

Trial Transcript - Day Four

•

12/11/2013

1

A.

Not at that point.

2

Q.

Not at that point?

3

A.

No.

4

Q.

So they left?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

Did Brenda stay?

7

A.

She stayed in there, yes.

8

Q.

And was Teresa still there?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

Just the three of you?

11

A.

Uh-huh.

12

Q.

Tell me what happened then, if Brenda said

..__,

}

:!
·'
1
!

·1
-.I

13

anything.

~

:!

A.

14
15

!J

Well, she -- she -- she just kept patting

me on the leg and said, "You wouldn't want her to live

16

like this," and it just continued and continued and

17

continued.

18

a state of shock over everything that had happened and

19

I was paying attention to what she was saying

20

because -- she was more or less saying my daughter

21

didn't have a·chance of any kind of a recovery, at

22

least that's the opinion that I got from what she

23

said.

:~

•

IJ

And I was just -- as I said, I was in such

24

Q.

You asked her that, did you?

25

A.

What?

·,,,

h

1

1

W•>'.•<-'.<'-C,._,,;,•. • '-'-~--••••'"''
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j
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1

Q.

2

you got?

3

A.

•

5

you should let her go .

6

9

•

•

Did she use any words such as " vegetable "

or " vegetative " ?

I don ' t recall her actually , other than

A.

what Teresa testified to, just to what she said .

I

don ' t recall her ever sayi ng it, it was j ust

11

constantly that I wouldn ' t want he r to live l ike that .

12
13

Q.

Okay .

A.

I

15

Q.

Okay .

16

And did you reply to her at all and

say anything to her?

14

don ' t -- I don ' t bel ieve I did .
What do you remember next

happening?

A.

We l l , I can ' t remember if they told

18

somebody they needed to call the family or if Teresa

19

just went out and did it .

20

think -- I think all of them were there at one

21

one point in time .

22

there saying the same thing to me and -- and my son

23

was -- "What ' s going on ," you know , becaus e all of

24

this had happened so fas t .

25

•

Q.

10

17

•

Yeah , that ' s just what -- h ow I felt she

was telling me that -- I felt like she was telling me ,

8

•

Did you ask her that or that ' s just what

4

7

•

12/11 /2013

Q.

And they got there and I
at

And Brenda ' s still sitting in

He was asking?

50 W est Broadway, Suite 900, Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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A.

1

Yes.

12/11/2013

And then -- and then they called the

2

code blue.

And I didn't know at the time that that

3

was for her because nobody had been in and told us

4

anything.

5

nobody had been in and said, well, this is what's

6

happening.
Q.

Dr. Pandita hadn't been in?

8

A.

No.

So we just went back in the

in

the -- or went out and went and stood in the door and

10

saw what they were doing with her and not

11

understanding what -- still what -- exactly what was

12

going on with her.
And was there anything said by Dr. Pandita

Q.

13

14

now at all?

15

A.

Not that I recall.

16

Q.

Not that you recall?
And do you recall them doing CPR on her

17

18

or --

19

A.

A nurse on top of her.

20

Q.

On top of her.

•

And you heard the

21

testimony and I'm not going to ask you to go through

22

this again, but you saw what was happening?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

Okay.

25

__,,,·

I mean we knew something was going on, but

7

9

,

MR. SCHLENDER:

That's all I have.

1c·
z
1~~1+:0
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1

here for --

2

(Discussion held off the record.}

3

THE COURT:

Lunch is going to be another

4

15 minutes, at least, before it's ready, so we're

5

going to go ahead with the next witness.

6

witness will this be?
MR. SCHLENDER:

·7

8

THE COURT:

Dr. Ginsberg, you may come up and be
sworn, please.
MR. NEWHALL:

13

14

And who will be examining?

You?

11

12

The next witness will be

Dr. Ginsberg.

9

10

Whose

I'm sorry, there's an

exhibit up here, we have to --

15
ARTHUR HENRY GINSBERG, M.D.,

16
17

called as a witness for and on behalf of the

18

plaintiff, being first duly sworn by the clerk, was

19

examined and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

20

21

BY MR. SCHLENDER:

Q.

22

23

Would you state your full name for the

record.

24

A.

Arthur Henry Ginsberg.

25

Q.

Where do you reside?

.

,·,

... :
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----tiiiil--~80

Page 428

•
•
•
•
•
•

•

Trial Transcript - Day Three

1

it's a reviewed study by your own peers and it ' s a

2

reputab le journal?

3

•

Q.

And does it have to relate to -- do these

4

studi es tha t you're going to talk about , do they

5

relate specifically to the condition Lori had?

6

A.

Yes , they did .

7

Q.

Okay .

8

A.

I ' d like to just tell you very bri efly

9

about the two studi es .

And these are studies that

10

were done quit e a long time ago, but they were two of

11

the major studies done in diabetic ketoacido sis .
One was done at the University of Basel in

12
13

Switze rland in 1971 , where they looked at 58 patients

14

wi th severe diabetic ketoacidosis , Lori ' s dis e ase .

15

And in that study , there was -- in the age group fr om

16

below 40 , Lo ri was 33 , there were O -- there was 0

17

mortality ou t of 19 patients that fell into that

18

category .

19

only one mortality.

20

recover from t hi s disease .

21

•

And eve n if you wen t up to 50 , there was
So age predicted the ability to

Now, in the second study , which was a very

22

la rge study of 2 57 patients with ketoacidosis , and

23

this was done at the University of Southern California

24

by a very reputable group .

25

the Journal of Diabetes and was a peer reviewed

The study was published in

l
l n 9!2..
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1

article .

•

Now , in these patients , the overall

2
3

mortality rate of the 253 patients was 9 percent

4

I ' m sorry , 13 percent .

5

patients recovered .

6

ketoacidosis , 13 percent mortality.

7

inconsiderabl e for any disease , but i t certainly is

8

not a lethal percentage when you have at least an

9

83 percent chance of rec overy .

So that 87 percent of those

They survived the diabetic

•

That ' s not

•

And remember , in the first study , if you

10
11

were under the age of 40 , there were no mortalit ies at

12

all.

13

I

l

Now , what about the second study?

14

patients who tended to recover were lower age .

15

had BUNs in the range of 30 .

16

blood infections .

17

infa rct ion ; in lay terms , a heart attack .

18

fulfilled all of those four criteria .

19
20
21

•

~

The

!

They

•

I!

They had no overwhelming

•

And they did not have a myocardial
They

So I think it ' s very important to know

•

about studies like that .
Now , in fairness, those patients were not

22

fol lowed or not reported in the journal article .

They

23

were mainly interested in who died and who survived .

II

24

Based on my experience of many , many years of having

I)

25

taken care of diabetic ketoacidosis , a majority of

1

•
•
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1

patients survive and go back to having a relatively

2

full life with normal activities of daily living .

•
•

•

Q.

3

Now , would this be patients that presented

4

t o have the same or similar physical conditions ,

5

et cetera , as Lori?

6

A.

Yes .

7

Q.

And would they -- the condition she was

8

in , you underst a nd the underlying problem was quickly

9

r esolved?
A.

Let me just address that briefly , if I

12

Q.

Sure .

13

A.

So you ' ve alread y heard that t he blood

10
11

•

12/10/20 13

may .

14

abnormalities corrected within about 48 hours .

15

sugar came down , the ketones came down.

16

carefully for liver disease and renal disease, didn ' t

17

find it .

18

the blood abno r malities normalized .

The

They looked

She didn ' t have a myocardial infarction .

So
;

20

ketoacidosis for the brain and spinal fluid, which the

21

brain rests in , to lag behind the blood .

t

~

Q.

How long?

23

A.

It can be anywhere from 72 hours to a week

25

1l

!

22

24

!i

However, it ' s no t uncommon in diabetic

19

.1

j

to even 10 to 14 days .

1

So diabetic ketoacidosis in Lori was an

•
•

~

,3Jf
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1

eminently salvageable si tuation .

2

to equilibra te in her s pinal fluid and her brain .

3

I t hink it ,. s very importa nt , based on those studi es,

•

She ne e ded more time
And

1
'!

l

•

·l

4

,1

to know that a high majority of th ese patients ,

~

,j

5

espe cially wi t h the four factor s that pertained to

6

Lori , had a fairly high chance of living through this

7

condition .

Q.

8

9

'

I!!

•

How would you characteri ze , Doctor , the

•

state we ' ve heard referred to as various things, as

10
11

12

between September 2nd and September 8th?

A.

13

14
15

16

I could do th at .

topic .
In order to be consciou s, you have to have
two things, all of us.

We have to have arousal .

That

means our brain is awake .

18

bra instem, from the very primitive part of t he brain .

19

Without that, you can ' t have consciousness .

21
22

i

I
I
I~
1,1

17

20

•

I think it ' s a confusing

That comes fr om the

•
•

Lori main tain ed brain stem functio n
throughout her hospit a lization .
The other thi ng you need besides arou sal

23

is awa r eness .

Awarene ss to the environment aro und

24

you ; visual, audito ry , tactile , olfactory , stimuli

25

that we all ha ve tha t come to us through our five

-- . -

•

•

··- -
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1

•

2
3

individual .
Q.

Would it ta ke days , weeks?

MR . HOBBS :

This . witness cannot discuss t he lengt h and effect of

6

these medications , as we discussed during the break .

8

9

10

11

•
•
•
•

12

MR . SCHLENDER :

•

Let me re phrase it .

BY MR . SCHLENDER :
As of the September 8th , do you have an

Q.

opinion as to whethe r or not Lo ri could have awakened?

A.

Oh , I definitely think Lori was eminently

salvageable as of September the 8th .

13

Q.

What do you mean by that?

14

A.

By that I mean that given more time and

15

proper management , as she had been getting , that there

16

was a very good chance that she would eventua lly wake

17

up and probably leave the hospital .

18

Q.

Have y ou seen that occur?

19

A.

Oh , man y times .

20

Q.

And let ' s talk about the study .

I want to

21

go back -- Dr . Peterso n talked about some st udies that

22

he had relied upon or that he had read and that he had

23

talked to the family about .

24

testimony?

25

•

Again , Your Honor , objection .

5

7

•

How long do

you hav e here to look at it?

4

•

12/ 10/2013

Do you recall that

I do .

A.
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Wels~1r: ;;~lit
n---

Lake City, UT 84101

~

THACKER+CO

Page 4 60

Trial Transcript - Day Three

1

degree of -- reasonable degree of medical certainty?

li

I •

2

A.

Yes , sir .

3

Q.

And are those opinions with respect to the

4

•

12/10/2013

i

stand ard of care applicabl e?

1
1
~

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

And the standard of care applicable to the 1

7

8

l

i

doctor would be what ?

A.

•

1l

J

My opinion is that the re was a breach of

9

the standard of care by Dr . Peterson that indirec t ly

10

resulted in a very n egative feeling for Teresa Moore

11

and for Lori ' s mom when they were asked by Dr . Pandita

12

whether or not they should do a tracheostomy or

13

attempt to put the breathing tube b ac k in .

I
j

•

'
I

14

•

I think there was a breach of the standard
:

15

of care there that indirectly resulted in Alta Wimmer

16

stopping the resuscitation wh ere it was .

17

had Dr . Peterson gone to Dr . Pandita before that

18

meeting a nd said , wait , this is too early , really , to

19

do anyth i ng.

20

want to tell the family that we can ' t make any

21

progn osis and we ' re certa inl y not going to give t he

22

kind of grim prognos i s that was given , where there was

23

reference to vegetable and vegetative state .

24
25

j

•

And I think

We need to keep everything going and I

'

I';

I;

And again , I ' m not in a position to say
wh et her that was said or not .

•
'j

•

t

That ' s based on the

•

50 West Broadway, Suite 900, Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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t e stimony , bu t I th i nk that was indi rectly re s ponsib le ;

2

for Alta Wimmer wanting to give up .

3

5

•

•

What

!

had been said that - A.

We l l , I think wha t had bee n sa i d was that

7

kind o f meani ngful r ecovery .

9

Q.

~
l

i

I

Di d you re a d i n the depo s i tions the word

"vegetable " ha d been used ?

10

A.

Yes .

11

Q.

"Vegetative " ?

12

A.

Yes .

13

Q.

And tell t he jury , wi t h rega r d to those

14

terms , what is t he connotat i on?

15

patients and f amilies about - - that are in dee p

16

trouble.

17

being used?
A.

You ' ve ta l ked to

What are t hose terms -- how do you see them

Fi r st o f all , they ' re pejorat i ve terms

19

that no doctor s hou l d use .

20

sensitivity wan t s t o hear that their loved one i s

21

going to be a vegetable .

22

e

And that was. the advice t h a t what?

i t was going to be very difficult f or her to have any

18

•

Q.

!

6

8

•

~

1

4

•

12/ 10/2013

I mean nobody with any

Persistent vegetative state has been

23

talked a lot about i n the pub l ic .

24

talking to a fami ly , to tell t hem

25

recovery is very unlike l y , I will say that .

I pre f er, if I ' m
~

if it ' s true that ~
And t hat

(

~

•
•
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1

there's any range of possibility that the person could

2

become dependent or have a very bad outcome, but I

3

certainly wouldn't use those terms of "persistent

4

vegetative state" or "vegetable" or "mentally

5

retarded."

6

medical or neurological lingo.

7

I just don't think that's-part of the

And I understand you have to accept the

Q.

8

testimony that you've read as true, but assuming that

9

those terms are used, how do you think it would have

10
11

12

an impact upon the overall care and· treatment of Lori?
Yes, I think it adversely impacted the

A.

subsequent decision to halt resuscitation.

13

Q.

Okay.

14

A.

And also, to not do a cricothyroidotomy or

15

tracheostomy.

16

And you understood that --

Q.

MS. BASSETT:

17

Objection, Your Honor.

18

These sound like opinions of -- of Dr. Pandita.

19

Dr. Peterson was not involved in the code where there

20

were discussions about that.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. SCHLENDER:

23

24
25

Sustained.
Sure.

BY MR. SCHLENDER:
At the time that the family discussions

Q.

were going on that has been talked about, Doctor, what

.~-...·-·

•r> , .

-.

..

•

~

-J~··• ,_,: •
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;
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1

would have b e en , within the sta ndard of care ,

2

a ppropriate to have told the family that you believe

3

was not told?

4

•
•

•
•
•

A.

~

Well , as I said , I think what wou l d have

•
n
j

;
I~

1!~

5

been appropriate was to have told the family that many

1

6

patients with this condition can recover .

7

patients recover within three to four days , some

'

8

patients can take as long as 10 to 14 to 21 days to

9

recover .

Some

10

There ' s a bell curve here .

11

of the bell curve is , you know , a recovery time of

12

four or five days .

13

bell curve, 20 days.

14

very light coma recover faster .

15

wh a t was not told to the family was that the outcome

16

here is potential l y very good and we should cont i nue

17

to support Lori .

In the middle

Out along the distant part of the
Maybe some patients who have

18

MR . SCHLENDER :

19

THE COURT :

But I think that was

Thank you.

That ' s all .

Mr . Hobbs?

CROSS EXAMINATION

20
21

•

12/10/2013

BY MR . HOBBS :

22

Q.

Good afternoon, Dr . Ginsberg .

23

A.

Good afternoon .

24

Q.

Before we g et i nto the opinions you

25

e xpressed , le t me just conf irm and make sure of the

'i

•

.,:,a....,Qll,O,.I,,_:-,
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~OTTONWOOD HOSPITAL

PATIENT: WIMMER, LORl ANN
PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIAN: . PHYSICIAN NOT CHOSEN
DATE OF ADMISSION: 9/2/2004
DATE OF DEATH: 9/8/2004
CHIEF COMPLAINT: Diabetic ketoacidosis.

HISTORY OF ILLNESS: This was a 33-year-old female who had history of type 1 diabetes on an insulin
pump, who had presented to emergency room one day prior to hospitalization and was found to be in diabetic
ketoacidosis. Patient was treated in the emergency room with IV fluids and insulin, however, patient left against
medical advice and returned on the day of admission with significant vomiting and was found to be in severe
acidosis and ketosis secondary to diabetes. The patient was significantly agitated and in respiratory distress in
emergency room and was intubated emergently. Patient's initial laboratory data showed a sodium of 127,
potassium of 6, a chloride of 90, bicarbonate of 7, glucose of 1112, BUN of 34, creatinine of 1.8, and 'WBC
count was 21.6, and she had a pH of 6.87 which was done after she was intubated and she was on the ventilator.
Patient also had significant ketosis with serum ketones greater than 80. Patient was managed in the ICU and
started on N fluids and IV insulin. Antibiotics were started. For the rest of the details of the initial history and
physical, please see my detailed dictated note on September 2, 2004.
HOSPITAL COURSE: The patient's diabetic ketoacidosis and renal insufficiency improved with aggressive
hydration and insulin therapy. Patient was found to have elevated cardiac enzymes and a cardiology evaluation
was obtained and Dr. Madsen saw the patient. He did not feel that the patient was having acute myocardial
injury, however, echocardiogram was done which showed nonnal systolic and diastolic function. While patient
improved medically, patient's neurological status continued to be poor. She was intennittently agitated, needing
continuous sedation. A neurology consultation was obtained and Dr. Petersen saw the patient on September 5,
2004, and he felt that the patient had metabolic encephalopathy due to diabetic ketoacidosis and other metabolic
factors, including severe acidosis at the time of admission. An EEG was obtained which showed a slow
response with electrical activity of 4-5 Hz and no epfleptiform waves. Dr. Petersen felt that the patient had a
poor prognosis based on the overall clinical status as well as the EEG findings. I saw the patient again on
September 7, 2004, and the patient's diabetic ketoacidosis had completely resolved, but she continued to be
comatose. Patient was still on sedation at this time, and it was unclear whether some of the effects may be due
to sedation. However, she was not needing significant support from the mechanical ventilator and we started
weaning her on the ventilator and was switched to presser support. I spoke at length with the family on
September 7, 2004. I inforn1ed them the patient's clinical status had improved in respect to her diabetes, renal
failure as well as respiratory failure. However, her neurological function was still poor and it was unclear as to
whether some of this could be due to sedation. I inforn1ed them that we would try to discontinue the sedation
and then assess her underlying neurologic response. On September 8, 2004, patient had been on CP AP of 5 for
significant length of time and her blood gases looked good. She had a good gag reflex. It was hard to keep her
off the sedation and at the same time keep her intubated as well. I felt it was important not to restart the sedation
to know her underlying response. Since she had been on minimal support on the ventilator) I thought it
reasonable to try and extubate her and see if all her agitation was due to her being intubated and whether she
Cottonwood Hospital
5770 South 300 East

Murray, Utah 84107
(801) 314-2065

PATIENT: WIMMER, LOR.I ANN
PHYSICIAN: SUNNYPANDITA, M.D.
DATE OF ADMISSION: 09/02/2004
DATE OF DISCHARGE: 09/08/2004
ENC: 62150313 MRN: 324667
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would not need any subsequent sedation. We extubated her subsequently. The family arrived meanwhile and
we had a family conference, which included the mother and sister of the patient, the social worker, Brenda, Dr.
Petersen, and myself. Since Dr. Petersen had been following the patient closely over the cow·se of several days,
he felt that there was a progressive deterioration in her neurological status. This was especially the fact that
patient had not received any sedation and did not have any purposeful response. He felt that the neurological
prognosis was very poor, and the patient could end up in a persistent vegetative state. The mother infom1ed us
that the patient had clearly indicated that she did not want to end up in a vegetative state. However, the famil y
was not ready to withdraw care at this point and felt that they needed some more time to reach that decision.
Around the same time, the patient started having increasing stridor and respiratory distress. A clinical decision
was made to reintubate the patient while the family could reach decision as to the ft.uther level of care. Patient's
vocal cords were very hard to visualize, and there was significant mucosa! edema around the larynx. We staited
bag ventilation on the patient and saturations remained in the range of90% and about. I immediately called for
assistance with intubating the patient. Dr. Eric Smart, the emergency room physician, arrived and attempted to
intubate the patient without success. Assistance .from in-house anesthesiologist was requested. I again
attempted to intubate the patient with the help of a bronchoscope without success. We again started bagging the
patient. A blind attempt at intubation was suggested and this was done by Dr. Smart. Meanwhile a tracheotomy
kit had been requested and was brought in. The anesthesiologist arrived and felt that the chest movement
seemed symmetrical and it was likely that the tube placement was okay. However, bagging the patient the
saturations did not come up and patient started becoming bradycardic. Until this time, the patient had
maintained reasonable saturations as well as blood pressure and pulse rate. Patient was given Atropine and
epineph rine and CPR was begun. I met with the family again and infom1ed them about her events and about the
initiation of CPR. The mother was thinking about stopping !he CPR but could not reach a decision. We
continued with the CPR and I did a quick bronchoscopy to visualize the placement of the tube and realized that
this was an esophageal placement. The tube was withdrawn and anesthesiologist was making an attempt to
place an endotracheal tube. While this was underway, the patient's mother came in and requested us to stop
CPR. Given the poor neurologic status to begin with, I felt this was reasonable and decided to stop the CPR.
Patient expired soon after and was declared dead at 1338 hours.

FINAL DIAGNOSES: Diabetic ketoacidosis with coma.

•
SP/er DD: 09/22/2004 15:33:05 DT: 09/22/2004 15:49:28 VJ: 323970 DOC: 48536

•
•
•

cc:

FREDERIC M . CIVISH, M.D.
INSTITUTE HEART & LUNG
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ROBERT G. WRIGHT [A5363]
BRANDON B. HOBBS [A8206]
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER NELSON

Wells Fargo Center, Fifteenth Floor
299 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Robert-Wright@rbmn.com
Brandon-Hobbs@rbmn.com
Telephone: (801) 531-2000
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506
Attorneys for Defendant David Scott Peterson, M.D.

IN THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Alta Wimmer, for herself and for the heirs of
Lori K. Wimmer,

Order on Defendants' Joint Motion for
Directed Verdict

Plaintiff,
vs.
Sunny Pandita, M.D. and David Scott
Peterson, M.D.,

Case No. 050910577
Judge Paul Maughan

Defendants.

Trial commenced in this matter on December 5, 2013, and Plaintiff rested her case on
December 11, 2013. Defendants thereafter moved for a directed verdict on the grounds that
Plaintiff had not proved economic damages, had not proved noneconomic damages, had not

satisfied her burden of proving punitive damages, and, in the case of Dr. Peterson, failed to prove

,_
January 21, 2014 01 :01 PM

1 of 7

•
•
a prima facic case of medical negligence with the absence of sufficient evidence to prove

•

causation. Plaintiff stipulated to voluntarily dismiss claims for economic damages and to
voluntarily dismiss the punitive damages claim against Dr. Peterson. The Court asked for fu1ther
briefing on the remaining issues. Dr. Peterson submitted a brief suppo1ting Defendants' Motion

•

for Directed Verdict. Dr. Panditajoined in the briefing and also argued that Plaintiff's claim for
punitive damages against him should also fail. Plaintiff submitted memoranda in opposition.
The Court, having heard oral argument and having reviewed the briefing submitted by the
pa1ties, and for good cause appearing therefore, hereby enters the following ORDER on

•

Defendants' Joint Motion for Directed Verdict:
Damages
Plaintiff bears the burden of proof to produce a sufficient evidentiary basis to establish

•

the fact of damages, or that damages were actually incurred. See Oxendine v. Overtwf, 1999 UT
4, ~ 19, 973 P.2d 417. lndeed, a plaintiff is required to prove both the fact of damages and the
amount of damages. See Stevens-Henager College v. Eagle Gate College, et al., 201 1 UT App

•

37, ~ 16,248 P.3d 1025, 1030, 255 P.3d 684 (Utah 2011) (citing TruGreen Cos. v. Mower Bros.,
2008 UT 81, ~ 15, 199 P.3d 929; Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 709
P.2d 330, 336 (Utah 1985)). To establish the fact of damages, "[t]he evidence ...must give rise to

•

a reasonable probability that the plaintiff suffered damage." Id. (quoting Atkin, 709 P.2d at 336;
see also Andreason v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 848 P.2d 171, 176 (Utah Ct.App.1993) ("[A]

plaintiff [must] prove the fact of damages by a preponderance of the evidence.... ")). "'While the

•
•

standard for determining the amount of damages is not so exacting as the standard for proving
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•
•
the fact of damages, there still must be evidence that rises above speculation and provides a
reasonable, even though not necessarily precise, estimate of damages."' Id. (quoting TruGreen,

•

2008 UT 81, ~ 15, 199 P.3d 929 ( other citation omitted)).1 The law requires that this evidence
shall not be so meager or uncertain as to afford no reasonable basis for inference, leaving the
damages to be detennined by sympathy and feelings alone. See Winsness v. M J. Conoco

•

Distributors, inc., 593 P.2d 1303, 1306 (Utah 1979). The level of persuasiveness required to
establish the fact of loss is generally higher than that required to establish the amount of a loss.
See Atkin Wright & Miles, 709 P.2d at 336.

•

Plaintiff does not seek to recover for economic damages in this matter and stipulated to
dismiss her claim for economic damages with prejudice. Pursuant to that stipulation, the Court
dismissed Plaintiff's claimed economic damages . As to Plaintiff's claim for non-economjc

•

damages, the Court concludes that, although some degree of uncertainty is allowed to establish
the fact of damages, the jury cannot be Ieft to mere speculation in making such an award. See id.
There must be some proof of the loss of affection; loss of society, counsel, or advice; loss of

•

comfort and pleasure the heirs would have received from the deceased; or loss of protection. See
Winsness, 593 P.2d at 1306. In this case, Plaintiff presented no evidence as to her loss of society,
love, companionship, protection and affection as a result of Lori Wimmer's death, and the jury

•

would be left to mere speculation as to whether those losses were in fact suffered.
I The Court takes no issue with the suggestion that model jury instruction CV2004 does not require the testimony of
any witness to establish the amount of non-economic damages. Further, the Court agrees that the statute governing
wrongful death actions, Section 78B-3- 106, provides that "damages may be given as under all the circumstances of
the case may be just" (emphasis added). As explained herein, however, Plaintiff has failed to establish the fact of
damages. As such, the Court finds that CV2004 and Section 78B-3- 106 do not compel a case to proceed to the jury
when plaintiff has failed to present evidence in support of her damage claims, so as to render the evaluation of
noneconomic losses nothing more than speculative.
·
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•
•
The Court disagrees with Plaintiffs position that she presented sufficient evidence of the
fact of her al leged non-economic loss during trial. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that she has

•

presented testimony from decedent's sister, Teresa Moore, that Ms. Moore and the decedent
were close to one another. This testimony is irrelevant because only a decedent's heirs are
entitled to recover, and Ms. Moore is not an heir .

•

Plaintiff further argues that evidence was presented at trial that decedent and her daughter
Meghan Case lived with Alta Wimmer during decedent's life. Although this may be true, it says
nothing about the loss of society, love, companionship, protection and affection allegedly

•

suffered as a result of Lori Winuner's death, and is therefore insufficient to establish a claim for
non-economic damages under Oxendine v. Overtwf Plaintiff also elicited testimony at trial
concerning the events of the decedent's final hours at the hospital. The Court finds that such

•

testimony is also insufficient as it fails to show how the decedent's passing affected the lives of
her heirs. Although Plaintiff presented testimony that Meghan Case told the decedent good-bye
and that she hoped the decedent would wake up from her coma, Plaintiff presented no evidence

•

at trial that Meghan Case actually suffered any non-economic loss from decedent's passing .
Because Plaintiff presented no evidence of non-econornic damages, and because the
parties stipulate that economic losses are not at issue, whether Plaintiff presented sufficient

•

evidence to pursue a claim for punitive damages against Dr. Pandita is moot.2 See UCA § 78B-820 l ( l )(a). Plaintiff must prove compensatory damages before punitive damages may be
awarded. Because Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence of non-economic damages at trial,

•

2 Plaintiff stipulated to dismiss punitive damages against Dr. Peterson. The Court entered an order dismissing
punitive damages against Dr. Peterson on December 12, 20 I 3.

,_

•
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•
•
and because economic damages and punitive damages are no longer at issue, Plaintiff has failed
to present a prima facie case of medical negligence against either Dr. Pandita or Dr. Peterson.

•

See Jensen v. IHC Hasps., Inc., 2003 UT 51, ii 96, 82 P.3d 1076 (holding that a plaintiff must
establish all four of the following elements to prove a prima facie case: "(1) the standard of care
by which the [physician's] conduct is to be measured, (2) breach of that standard by the
[physician], (3) injury that was proximately caused by the physician's negligence, and (4)

damages" (emphasis added)). Accordingly, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants' joint Motion
for a Directed Verdict as to the issue of damages and ORDERS that all of Plaintiffs claims

•

against Dr. Pandita and Dr. Peterson are hereby dismissed as a matter of law, with prejudice, and
on the merits.

Causation

•

As an alternative basis for dismissal of Plaintiffs claims against Dr. Peterson, the Court
concludes that Plaintiff has failed to establish a causal link between Dr. Peterson's acts and
Plaintiffs alleged damage. During trial, Plaintiff elicited testimony from her expert Dr. Ginsberg

•

that Dr. Peterson's actions indirectly led to Alta Wimmer's decision to cease resuscitation effo1ts
on the decedent. The Court finds that such an indirect effect is insufficient for Plaintiff to meet
her burden pursuant to Proctor v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 2013 UT App 226 at~ 10, 311 P.3d

•

564 (noting "[p]roximate cause refers to the basic requirement that before recovery is allowed in
tort, there must be some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct
alleged" (emphasis added)). In any event, Dr. Ginsberg is without sufficient foundation to testify

•

regarding the rationale for Ms. Winuner's decision.

January 21 , 2014 01 :01 PM
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•
•
More importantly, Plaintiff Alta Wimmer offered no testimony at trial that Dr. Peterson
influenced her decision to cease resuscitation efforts on decedent or that she relied in any way on

•

Dr. Peterson's advice in making her decision regarding the decedent's care. In the absence of any
competent evidence that Dr. Peterson's actions caused Alta Wimmer to cease resuscitation
efforts on the decedent, Plaintiff cannot prove a prima facie case of medical negligence against

•

Dr. Peterson. See Jensen, 2003 UT 5 l at ~I96. Accordingly, the Court hereby GRANTS Dr.
Peterson's Motion for a Directed Verdict as to causation and hereby dismisses Plaintiffs claims
against Dr. Peterson as a matter of law and with prejudice .

•

Each pa1ty is to bear their own costs in this matter.
END OF PLEADING

•

•
•

Approved as to form:

/s/ Nan T. Bassett
Shawn McGarry
Nan T. Bassett
Attorneys for Sunny Pandita, M.D .

S. Clark Newhall
Attorney for Plaintiff Alta Wimmer and for the heirs of Lori K. Wimmer

•
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Attorneys for Plaintiff

0

Lee Schlender
2700 Holly Lynn Drive
Mountain Home, ID 83647

D

•

D

Attorneys for Plaintiff

D

Shawn McGarry
Nan T. Bassett
K1rP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.
10 Exchange Place, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 111

•

D

0

U.S. Mail -Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Electronic Filing
Email
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Hand Delivery
Electronic Filing
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Attorneys for Defendant Sunny Pandita, MD.
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ROBERT G. WRJGHT [A5363]
BRANDON B. HOBBS [A8206]
R!CHARDS BRANDT MILLER NELSON

•
•

Wells Fargo Center, Fifteenth Floor
299 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 110-2465
Robert-Wright@rbmn.com
Brandon-Hobbs@rbmn.com
Telephone: (801) 531-2000
Fax No .: (80 1) 532-5506
Attorneys for Defendant David Scott Peterson, M.D.
IN THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRJCT COURT

•
•

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Alta Wimmer, for herself and for the heirs of
Lori K. Wimmer,
Ord er on PlaintifPs Motion for New Trial

Plaintiff,
VS.

•

Sunny Pandita, M.D. and David Scott
Peterson, M.D.,

Case No. 050910577
Judge Paul Maughan

Defendants.

This matter came before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial, filed on or

•

about December 31, 2013. Defendant David Scott Peterson, M.D., filed a memorandum in
opposition to Plaintiffs Motion on or about January 15, 2014, and Defendant Sunny Pandita,
M.D., filed ajoinder in Dr. Peterson's opposition on or about January 15, 2014. Thereafter,

•

•

April 11 , 2014 03:05 PM
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Plaintiff filed a reply memorandum in support of her Motion and submitted the matter for
decision on January 22, 2014. The Court heard oral argument on Plaintiffs Motion for New
Trial on March 18, 2014, and the matter is now ripe for the Court's ruling and order.
Plaintiff moves this Court for a new trial on the sole basis that an error of law occurred
when the Court granted Defendants' Motion for Directed Verdict. See Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(7).
The Court, having heard oral argument and having reviewed the briefing submitted by the
parties, and for good cause appearing therefore, hereby enters the following ORDER on
Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial:
Plaintiff bears the burden of proof to produce a sufficient evidentiary basis to establish
the fact of damages, or that damages were actually incurred. See Oxendine v. Overturf, 1999 UT
4, ~ 19, 97 3 P .2d 417. Indeed, a plaintiff is required to prove both the fact of damages and the
amount of damages. See Stevens-Henager College v. Eagle Gate College, et al., 2011 UT App
37,116,248 P.3d 1025, 1030, 255 P.3d 684 (Utah 2011) (citing TruGreen Cos. v. Mower Bros.,
2008 UT 81, 115, 199 P.3d 929; Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 709
P.2d 330, 336 (Utah 1985)).
To establish the fact of damages, "[t]he evidence ... must give rise to a reasonable
probability that the plaintiff suffered damage." Id. (quoting Atkin, 709 P.2d at 336; see also
Andreason v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 848 P.2d 171, 176 (Utah Ct.App.1993) ("[A] plaintiff

[must] prove the fact of damages by a preponderance of the evidence .... ")). "'While the
standard for dctennining the amount of damages is not so exacting as the standard for proving
the fact of damages, there still must be evidence that rises above speculation and provides a

April 11, 2014 03:05 PM
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•
•
reasonable, even though not necessarily precise, estimate of damages."' Id. (quoting TruGreen,

•

2008 UT 81, ~[ 15, 199 P.3d 929 (other citation omitted)) .
The law requires that this evidence shall not be so meager or uncertain as to afford no
reasonable basis for inference, leaving the damages to be determined by sympathy and feelings

alone. See Winsness v. M J. Conoco Distributors, Inc., 593 P .2d 1303, 1306 (Utah 1979) .

•

When the Court granted Defendants' Motion for Directed Verdict, Plaintiff immediately
moved to re-open her case, recognizing that she had not presented evidence that she and/or
Meghan Case had, in fact, suffered general damages. The Court denied Plaintiffs motion to re-

•

open and explained that it would not allow Plaintiff to remedy an error that had just been pointed
out through Defendants' directed verdict motion.
In granting Defendants' Motion for Directed Verdict, the Court did not weigh the

•

evidence but considered all reasonable inferences from the evidence that had been admitted. The
Court found an absence of any evidence at trial to establish a recoverable loss, including but not
limited to any evidence regarding financial support furnished; loss of affection, counsel, and

•

advice; loss of the deceased's care and solicitude for the welfare of the family; or loss of the
comfort and pleasure the family would have received. See Oxendine. 1999 UT 4 at ~ 19; Switzer
v. Reynolds, 606 P.2d 244,247 (Utah 1980).

•

Indeed, Plaintiff presented no evidence regarding the loss of companionship, affection, or
society from which reasonable inferences could have been made regarding the relationship
between the deceased and her heirs. The evidence Plaintiff did present and to which Plaintiff

•
•

cites as evidence of general damages does not establish a recoverable loss absent speculation.

April 11 , 2014 03:05 PM
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Although Plaintiff presented evidence that the decedent and her daughter Meghan Case lived
with Plaintiff Alta Wimmer during decedent's life, this evidence says nothing about the loss of
society, love, companionship, protection and affection allegedly suffered as a result of Lori
Wimmer' s death, and is therefore insufficient to establish a claim for non-economic damages
under Oxendine v. Overturf. Plaintiff also elicited testimony at trial concerning the events of the
decedent's final hours at the hospital. The Court again concludes that such testimony is also
insufficient as it fails to show how the decedent's passing affected the lives of her heirs. If the
Court had not granted a directed verdict in favor of Defendants, the jury would have been left to
speculate regarding whether Plaintiff or decedent's heir in fact suffered a loss.
Given the total lack of evidence to establish the fact of damages, the Court correctly
granted a directed verdict in favor of Defendants. The Court therefore concludes that there was
no error in law in granting Defendants' Motion for Directed Verdict. Accordingly, the Court
hereby DENIES Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial. In denying Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial,
the Court also finds that Plaintiff assigned no error to the Court's additional basis for granting a
directed verdict in favor of Dr. Peterson on the issue of causation; therefore, the Court also
DENIES Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial to the extent the Motion seeks a new trial on the
claims against Dr. Peterson.

END OF PLEADING
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•
Approved as to form:

•

/s/ Nan T. Bassett (with permission)
Shawn McGan-y
Nan T. Bassett
Attorneys for Sunny Pandita, M.D .

•
S. Clark Newball
Attorney for Plaintiff Alta Wimmer and for the heirs of Lori K. Wimmer

•
•

•
•
•
•
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1 HER.EBY CERTIFY that on the 21st day of April, 20 14, l served the Order on
Defend ants' Joint Motion for Directed Verdict on the persons identified below as indicated:

•
•
•

Clark Newhall
LAW OFFICE OF CLARK NEWHALL
57 West 200 South, Suite 101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

0

•

U.S. Mail - Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Electronic Filing
Email

•

Attorneys for Plaintiff

0

Lee Schlender
2700 Holly Lynn Drive
Mountain Home, ID 83647

•
•
•

Attorneys for Plaintiff

0

Bruce Pritchett
57 West 200 South, Suite 101
Salt Lake City, Utah 8410 I

---

•
•
•

Attorneys for Plaintiff

•
•
•

Shawn McGarry
Nan T. Bassett
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.
l OExchange Place, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 11 1

0

U.S. Mail- Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Electronic Filing
Email

•

U.S . Mail -Postage Prepaid
Hand Delive1y
Electronic Filing
Email
U.S. Mail - Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Electronic Filing
Email

Attorneys for Defendant Sunny Pandita, M.D.

•
/s/ Penny Edwards
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•

SHAWN McGARRY - #5217
NAN T. BASSETT - #8909
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.
Attorneys for Sunny Pandita, M.D .
10 Exchange Place, Fourth Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 841 11
Telephone: (801)521 -3773
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY

•

•

STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

ALTA WIMMER, for herself and for the
heirs ofLORl K. WIMMER,
Plaintiff,
VS.

•

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION IN LIMINE FOR EXCLUSION
OF "AGAINST MEDICAL ADVICE"
EVIDENCE

SUNNY PANDITA, M.D .; DAVID SCOTT
PETERSON, M.D.; and, IHC HEALTH
SERVICES, INC., dba COTTONWOOD
HOSPITAL,

Civil No. 050910577
Judge Paul Maughan

Defendants .

•

The Plaintiffs Motion in Limine for Exclusion of "Against Medical Advice" Evidence
came before the Couii for hearing on November 1, 20 l 3. The Court, having reviewed the
briefing and having heard oral argument, hereby ORDERS , ADJUDGES and DECREES the

•

following:
I.

Plaintiffs Motion in Limine for Exclusion of "Against Medical Advice" Evidence

is DENIED;

•
e

-1-

December 05, 2013 01 :04 PM
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•
--2.

Medical records and other evidence referring to Lori Wirnmer's departure from

Cottonwood Hospital "against medical advice" ("AMA") may be admitted into evidence;
3.

This Order is made for the reasons stated in Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs

Motion in Limine for Exclusion of "Against Medical Advice" Evidence and specifically,
Whether Lori Winuner leaving Cottonwood Hospital AMA on September 1, 2004 was negligent

•

and causative of her death goes to weight;
4.

The special verdict form may include a line for allocation of fault to Lori

Wimmer; and,
5.

The parties shall each bear their own costs and attorney fees related to said

motion.
DATED this _ _ day of November 2013.

•

BY THE COURT

•

JUDGE PAUL MAUGHAN

•
•

-2-
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
On this 26 th day of November 2013, the foregoing ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION IN LIMINE FOR EXCLUSION OF "AGAINST MEDICAL ADVICE"
EVIDENCE was e-filed through the Utah State Court to the following:
Clark Newhall
LAW OFFICE OF CLARK NEWHALL MD JD
57 West 200 South, Suite 101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Plaintiff

•

Lee Schlender
SCHLENDER LAW OFFICE
2700 Holly Lynn Drive
Mountain Home, ID 8364 7
Attorney for Plaintiff

Brandon B. Hobbs
Robert Wright
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
299 S Main Street, 15 th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for David Scott Peterson, MD.

/s/ Mikelle Ramirez
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM DECISION

ALTA WIMMER, for herself and for
the heirs of LORI K. WIMMER,

CASE NO.

050910577

P l aintiff,
vs.
SUNNY PANDITA, M.D.; BRENDA
BLACKHAM, M.D.; DAVID SCOTT
PETERSON, M.D . , and IHC HEALTH
SERVICES, INC., dba COTTONWOOD
HOSPITAL,
Defendants.

This matter came before the Court for a hearing on June 15, 2011,

•

in connection with defendant Sunny Pandita, M.D . 's Motion to Preclude
Testimony of Plaint iff's Expert Stan Smith, Ph.D., Dr. Pandita's Motion
in Limine to Preclude Charles Landers, M.D., as a Rebuttal Witness and
defendant

David Scott Pet erson M. D . ' s

Testimony .

Motion to Strike Dr.

Landers'

•

At the conclu sion of the hearing, the Court took the matter

under advisement to further consider the parties '

written submissions,

the relevant legal authority. and counsel's oral argument .

Being now

•

fully informed , the Court rules as stated herein .
The
Smith' s

Court

first addresse s

testimony and expert

Dr .

Pandi ta' s

opinions

Motion

regarding

a

concern ing

component

of

Dr.
the

plaintiff's damages which stem from the "loss of enjoyment of life" and
gid

•

¥MR

218 0 •

•
•
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•
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" loss of the society or relationship."

Dr.

Pandita argues that Dr .

Smith ' s opinions , based on a "value of life" model, does not meet the
fundamental criteria for admissibility under Rule 702 of the Utah Rules

•

of Evidence and the standards for determining admissibili ty of technical
or scientific expert testimony set forth in State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d
388, 402-405 (Utah 1989) .
The plaint iff's Opposition suggests that Dr. Pandita has misapplied

•

both Rule 702 and Rimmasch, which applied a pre-2007 version of Rule 702 .
However, in the recent case of Eskelson ex . rel. Eskelson v . Davis Hosp.
and Medical Center, 242 P .3d 762, 766 (Utah 2010) , the Court recognized

•
•
•
•
•

the continuing relevance of Rimmasch :
In amending rule 702, the court did not intend to make it more
difficult to admit expert testimony, but rather to clarify the
requirements for admission. Aspects of the Rimmasch test
continue to be applicable under amended rule 702. For example ,
rule 702(b) , like Rimmasch, requires a determination to
determine whether a party has met its threshold burden to show
the reliability of the principles that form the basis for the
expert ' s testimony and the reliability of applying those
principles to the facts of the case. And, similar to the
Rimmasch standard, rule 702 (c) a llows the court to take
judicial notice of principles that h ave been accepted by the
relevant expert community .
The advisory committee notes make clear that the n ew rule 702
"assigns to trial judges a 'ga tekeeper ' responsibility to
screen out unreliable expert testimony"-not just scientific
expert testimony.
When applying the new rule 702, judges
should approach expert testimony with "rat ional skepticism."
But the "degree of scrutiny [that should be applied to expert
testimony by trial judges] is not so rigorous as to be
satisfied only by scientific or other specialized principles
or methods that are free of controversy or that meet any fixed
set of criteria fashioned to test reliability . n Importantly ,

? 1

O _.

•
•
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both subsections (b) and (c) require the plaintiff to make
only a "threshold showing of reliability .
11

Id.

(internal citations omitted)
While the plaintiff concedes that Dr. Smith's opinions are not "free

of

controversy,"

she

argues

that

Dr.

Smith

nevert heless

meets

•

the

The Court disagrees and concludes

threshold showing of reliability .

instead that Dr. Smith's theories have been largely re j ected both by the
economics community and in jurisprudence.
Dr.
reviewed

Pandita ' s moving papers discuss various economists who have
Dr.

Smith's

opinions

and

his

attempts

enjoyment of life for purposes of litigation .

to

value

the

lost

These com_m entaries speak

•

to Dr. Smith's "misuse " of principles concerning the value of statistical
life and conclude that his application of such principles in the present
type

of

context

probability.

111

"fal ls

outside

of

the

parameters

of

'reasonable

See e.g. Affidavit of John 0. Ward , Ph. D.

In addition, Dr . Pandita cites a number of legal opinions where Dr.
Smit h ' s

value of

life

testimony was

excluded.

Wh ile

the plaintiff

suggests a trend towards acceptance of Dr. Smith's opinions, the Court
finds no evidence of this .

•

To the contrary, the isolated cases relied

on by the plaintiff are either inapplicable in a wrongful death case or
are no longer good case law.
After considering the foregoing,

the Court determines

that Dr.

•

Smith's opinions are not specifically based on the facts of this case,

2 1 R ?.

•

•
--

•

•

are fundamentally subjective and are inherently unreliable. The plaintiff
has not met
principl es

•

MEMORANDUM DECISION

PAGE 4

WIMMER V . PANDITA

t he

threshold burden of showing

that

form

the

basis

for

Dr.

the reliability of the

Smith 's

testimony

and

the

re l iability of applying those principles to the facts of this case .
Accordingly,

exercising the gatekeeper responsibilities discussed

in

Eskelson, this Court concludes that Dr . Smith's loss of enjoyment of life
opinions must be excluded at trial .

•

Accordingly, Dr. Pandita's Motion

to Preclude Smith's testimony is granted both for the reasons set forth
herein and on the grounds detailed in Dr . Pandita's· Motion.
Next, the Court grants the defendants' Motions with respect to Dr.

•

Landers.

The Court concludes that Dr. Landers' testimony is not proper

rebuttal

testimony and is cumulative of plaintiff's other experts .

Foremost,

Dr.

Landers'

evidence off ered

•

cumulative

of

including

Drs .

testimony does not

by the defendants

opinions
Ali

and

offered

by

Ginsberg .

or

refute any new points or

their experts,

the

plaintiff's

The

plaintiff

but
other

argues

rather

is

experts,
that

the

defendants , in presenting their case, will i ntroduce new evidence to the

•

jury, which will the refore allow Dr . Landers to prop erly testify as a
rebuttal witnes s .

However, while the evidence discussed at the hearin g

may be new to the jury, it will not be unanticipated .
Accordingly, the Court grants the defendants' Motions and st rikes

• ,_
•

Dr. Landers as a rebuttal expert witness .

•

•
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This Memorandum Decision wi ll stand as the Order of the Court.

/

Dated this

~

day of July ,

•
•

•

•
•
•

•
·- ·

•
WIMMER V . PANDITA

•

•
•

•
•

•

•
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hereby certify that I

mailed a

true and correct copy of the

foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this
2011:
Clark Newhall
Cheri Gochberg
Attorneys for Plaintiff
57 West 200 South, Suite 101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Shawn McGarry
Nan T. Bassett
Gary T. Wight
Attorneys for Defendant Pandita
10 Exchange Place, Fourth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Robert G. Wright
Brandon B . Hobbs
Attorneys for Defendant Peterson
299 S. Main Street, Suite 1500
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Kurt M. Frankenburg
Carolyn Stevens Jensen
Attorneys for Defendant Blackham
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
P.O . Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678
Brinton R. Burbidge
Patrick L. Tanner
Attorneys for Defendant IHC Services
15 W. South Temple, Suite 950
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

•

OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

fllEf? DISTRICT COURT

ALTA WIMMER,

Third Judicial District

MAR 3 1 2014

Plaintiff,

SALT LAKE COUNTY

vs.

c1rs~10577

fl ,1

Uf

•

Deputy Clerk
SUNNY PANDITA,

•

Defendant.

---------------------------------------------------------ORAL ARGUMENT

•

---------------------------------------------------------Electronically Recorded on
March 18, 2014

BEFORE:HONORABLEPAULG. MAUGHAN
Third District Court Judge

•
•
•

i

1
I '

I

•
•

Oral Argument

1

plaintiff .

2

they don ' t get to speculate that way .

3

And we can either have that established now or we can

4

establish that in some other forum .

5

oh , you don ' t get to speculate but the law clearl y say

6

you must indulge- -

8

That ' s a reasonable inference .

THE COURT :

7

•

3/1 8/2014

That ' s wrong .

But to say that ,

Are you listening to what your

argument is?
MR . PRITCHETT :

9

10

THE COURT :

11

MR . PRITCHETT :

12

Well , no ,

Yes .

j

Do you - What would the Court like to

I
I

I

say?

l

•

THE COURT :

13

14

•

MR . PRITCHETT :

I
J

Well , I don ' t know how we can

talk about an error without saying that it was wrong .

17
18

Well , I just wonder if you

realize how of f ensive you are to the Cour t ?

15

16

i

THE COURT :

You can say there was - -we ' re

claiming that there was an error .

''
(

•
•

•

•

19

MR . PRITCHETT :

20

THE COURT :

Okay .

We could have th i s addressed now

21

or , if we need to , we can see if there was an error

22

confirmed on appeal .

23

argument , and i t ' s not being taken very well by this

24

Court .

25

telling you , you're out of order and you ' re offensive

But this is an in- your - face

I ' m indulging it.

I ' ll take it .

But I ' m

50 West Broadway, Suite 900, Salt Lake City, UT 8410 1
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1

and you don't need to be.

2

persuasive if you would argue in a more civil,

3

controlled and less in-your-face manner.

4

less offensive to the Court.

5

presenting it, it's like--the Court's either going to

6

just be shamed into adopting your--or it will dig in

7

its heels and say to heck with you.

8

good your argument is.

9

that's the initial response.
Okay.

10
11

Because you'd be a lot more

That would be

But the way you're

I don't care how

I'm not going to do that, but

Go ahead.

I'm through giving my

mentoring.

12

MR. PRITCHETT:

Okay.

13

The way that I would like to approach the

14

argument is from what I think are fairly clearly

15

established principles.

16

in the grey areas--but if people can agree on the

17

fundamental propositions and reason from there,

18

oftentimes parties can arrive at an agreed end point.

19

And I think that there hasn't been any dispute from the

20

other side as to what the proper standard for a grant

21

of directed verdict is.

22

grant a directed verdict all reasonable inferences must

23

be indulged in favor of the plaintiff.

24

with the argument that's going on in court right now is

25

they're saying, well, they're just speculating and that

Where it takes us off turn is

And that is that in order to

And the problem

1,
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•

1

provides the reasonable inference that the jury could

2

determine the fact of damages from .

3

THE COURT :

4

MR . PRITCH ETT :

5

THE COURT :

If you take every fact that I can

thin k of to be the same in a hypothetical .

7

a parent and a child living together , and that child

8

has been not hing but a source of frustration , expense,

9

anger and heartbreak to t hat parent .

So we have

And then that

10

child is put in the hospital through the fault of

11

somebody else ' s .

12

And , in fact , because the child had nowhere else to

13

live , the child was consigned to a basement room at the

14

far end of the house and said , "Here's your key , here ' s

15

your entrance , but I don ' t want to see you in the

16

house .

And the parent goes to the hospital .

I don ' t want to see you upstairs .

Not in the

17

kitchen .

18

that ' s it ."

19

on dope and drugs and crime for 25 years is now in the

20

hospital, the victim of some wrongful act .

21

parent goes to the hospital and says , you know ,

22

"Son/daught er , son , don ' t die .

23

And what is that?

24

that , if anything?

Not in the bedroom .

j

I;

You have a bedroom and

And now this child who has been strung out

And the

I really do love you . "

I mean , what is a jury to do wi t h

MR . PRITCHETT :

-

•

Okay .

6

25

•

Let me ask you a question.

-

...... ;;...,

Well , I think--

4

-

_J
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i

1

to the amount of damages.

But they're saying, no,

2

because there was none of that, the fact of damages was

3

not proven.

4

flawed reasoning that should not stand.

1
{
~

That's a backwards reasoning.

4

j

That's

I'd like to point out to the Court that no

5
6

case was cited in this courtroom on the record during

7

this argument making any distinction between the

8

benefit and the burden of people living with each

9

other.

That case has not been cited to the Court.

10

There are a couple--

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. PRITCHETT:

13

THE COURT:

So let me follow up on that.
Sure.

I agree there's no case, but in

14

the Court's hypothetical--we'll do one other bit here.

15

The other parent wasn't sad to lose a child.

16

actually quite relieved.

17

relieved for the child; the pain and suffering was

18

gone.

19

are all--you know, there will be no more of that.

He was

Relieved for themselves,

The anxious nights, the wasted years, the stress

20

MR. PRITCHETT:

21

THE COURT:

Uh-huh.

Thanks for dying.

It hurts.

But it's the best result for everybody.

I'm

22

sad.

So now

23

we're getting back to the jury for wrongful death and

24

there's no positive inference at all.

I mean there's

25

nothing positive in this relationship.

All the jury

50 West Broadway, Suite 900, Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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1

what you said , he lived in your basement and you cried

2

and wiped his brow and we think that that ' s sufficient

3

to show a good , positive relationship and so we will

4

consider damag e.

5

dad walk out with crocodile tears and all this money

6

that they thought , are you kidding me?

7

glad he ' s gone .

•
•

9

•

•

What ' s this ?
Okay .

But I think in the

10

drawn from the evidence ; that the inferences could be

11

drawn one way or the other .

12

THE COURT:

13

MR . PRITCHETT :

14

THE COURT:

15

MR . PRITCHETT :

16

THE COURT :

17

lI
,l

~

That ' s my point .
Am I

understanding?

That ' s my po i nt .
Okay .

What ' s a jury to know based on

:I
l

the same evidence?
MR . PRITCHETT :

And that's a question that

19

the courts have wrestled with before .

20

Gorden v . Sharon ' s Cultural Education and Recreational

21

Associat i on ta lks about that .

22

- the cite for this- - this wasn ' t

23

the bri e fing but it ' s a case that I brought because I

24

thought that there might be some discussion about this

25

subject .

The case of

They say in there- - thiscited to the Court in

It 's Gorden v . Sharon ' s Cultura l Education

.. -

•

I mean , we ' re

Court 's hypothetical we' re talking about the inference

18

•

And then they did damage and mom and

MR. PRITCHETT :

8

•

3/18/2014

.... ·-·

-

-

-- ·-

-

-

.-

50 West Broadway, Suite 900, Salt Lake City, UT 84101

A--11
THACKE~

Page 38

..,0

1
l

!

j

